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I. Pennsylvania Constitutional Law
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS-ADMINISTRATIVE HEAR-
ING-R. v. Commonwealth, 636 A.2d 142 (Pa. 1994)-The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that a defendant's right to due
process is not violated when a hearing examiner makes credi-
bility determinations regarding witnesses who testify while the
examiner is not present, and when the defendant's daughter
testifies in camera and out of the defendant's presence.
In R. v. Commonwealth,' the appellant brought suit challeng-
ing the administrative procedure through which his request to
expunge a report from his record was denied.2 The report indi-
cated that substantial evidence existed that the appellant had
sexually abused his daughter.' The Department of Public Wel-
fare denied the appellant's written request to expunge his re-
cord, and the appellant appealed to the Department's Office of
Hearings and Appeals (the "Office"). 4 A five-day hearing was
conducted, and the hearing examiner who issued the recommen-
dation was only present for the final day of testimony.5 After
the hearing, and based on the recommendation of the hearing
officer, the Office denied the appellant's request to expunge his
record." The commonwealth court affirmed this decision.7
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the appel-
lant raised two primary allegations of error.' First, he claimed
that he had been denied due process because the hearing exam-
iner who made the recommendation made credibility findings
regarding witnesses who did not testify while that examiner was
presiding The appellant also claimed that his due process
rights were violated when his daughter was permitted to testify
in camera."
1. 636 A.2d 142 (Pa. 1994).
2. R., 636 A.2d at 144.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. A different hearing examiner presided over the first four days of the
hearing. Id.
6. Id.
7. R., 636 A.2d at 144.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. "The term 'in camera' is used to describe judicial proceedings which
are held in private or in the judge's chambers." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 760 (6th
ed. 1990). Because the hearing involved the defendant's alleged sexual abuse of his
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The court first noted that because the case involved an admin-
istrative proceeding the appellant's hearing had to satisfy a
separate and distinct group of requirements in order to comply
with due process. 1 The court explained that the Office, and not
the hearing examiner, was the ultimate finder of fact.12 There-
fore, the court reasoned that if a representative of the Office was
always present during the hearing, the ultimate factfinder was
always present."8
Further, the court asserted that the absence of the hearing
examiner did not result in arbitrary action by the Office, nor did
it infringe upon the procedural safeguards of the hearing. 4 The
court noted that due process required the Office to be "subject to
judicial review on the substantial evidence test," and the Office
was "required to explain its decision in sufficient detail to per-
mit meaningful appellate review."" The court held that in the
present case both procedural safeguards were satisfied. 6 There-
fore, the appellant had not been denied due process. 7
The appellant's second contention was that his forced absence
during his daughter's testimony denied him due process under
both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. 8 The
court applied the test set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge9 to determine whether the ap-
pellant was denied due process under the federal constitution."
As to the first factor of the test, the private interest that is af-
fected, the court determined that the defendant could not allege
a liberty or property interest sufficient to require his presence at
the in camera hearing." With regard to second factor, the court
daughter, the hearing examiner allowed the daughter to testify in camera and out of
the presence of the defendant. R., 636 A.2d at 144.
11. R., 636 A.2d at 144.
12. Id. at 145.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting Peak v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 501 A.2d
1383, 1389 (Pa. 1985)).
16. R., 636 A.2d at 145.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 146. The appellant also claimed a deprivation of his right to con-
front witnesses brought against him under Section 9 of Article I of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Id. The court asserted that this provision applied solely to criminal
prosecutions, and the appellant was involved in an administrative proceeding. Id.
19. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
20. R., 636 A.2d at 146. The court noted that the test involved three factors:
1) the private interest infringed upon by the states action; 2) the chance of a
wrongful deprivation of private interests through the procedures utilized and the
helpfulness of any additional safeguards; and, 3) the state's interests. R., 636 A.2d
at 146 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335)).
21. R., 636 A.2d at 147-48.
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concluded that there was no risk of erroneous deprivation be-
cause the defendant's attorney was present during the in camera
hearing and the defendant was able to communicate with his
attorney.' Finally, the court determined that the third factor,
which it characterized as the government's interest in protecting
the witness from further injury, outweighed any alleged viola-
tion of the defendant's right to due process.' Therefore, the
court concluded that the appellant's due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment were not violated.'
Next, the court analyzed the appellant's claim under Section 1
of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution.' The court as-
serted that the due process requirements of the Pennsylvania
Constitution were indistinguishable from those required by the
Fourteenth Amendment." In light of this conclusion, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court adopted the "Mathews methodology" as
the proper test to analyze due process claims under Section 1 of
Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 27 Noting that it had
already performed an analysis of the appellant's claims under
this test, the court held the appellant's due process rights had
not been violated. 8 Therefore, the decision to deny the
appellant's request to expunge his record was affirmed.'e
As a result of this decision, all due process claims brought
under Section 1 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution
will be examined using the test set out by the United States
Supreme Court in Mathews. However, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court noted that this analysis would not always produce
the same result under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Pennsylvania Constitution.3 ° In cases where the interest being
infringed receives greater protection under state law than it
22. Id. at 150.
23. Id. at 151.
24. Id. at 152.
25. Id. Section 1 provides, "[a]ll men are born equally free and independent,
and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoy-
ing and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property
and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness." PA. CONST. art. I, § 1. The
court also noted that section 9 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution also
guaranteed the right of due process, however this section only applied to criminal
proceedings. R., 636 A.2d at 152 n.10.
26. R., 636 A.2d at 152 (citing Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 141 A.2d
606 (Pa. 1958) (stating that the requirements of section 1 of Article I of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution are indistinguishable from section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment)).
27. R., 636 A.2d at 153.
28. Id.
29. Id.
3*0. Id. at 153 n.12.
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does under federal law, the result of the Mathews analysis will
vary.
31
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEI-
ZURE-DRUG COURIERS-REASONABLE SUSPICION-Common-
wealth v. Lewis, 636 A.2d 619 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that police must observe conduct that gives
rise to a reasonable suspicion before a random stop of an indi-
vidual may be made.
In Commonwealth v. Lewis, 2 the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania significantly limited the ability of law enforcement person-
nel to utilize a drug courier profile in their attempt to stem the
flow of drugs into Pennsylvania.' The defendants in Lewis
were found guilty of cocaine possession with the intent to deliv-
er.' The defendants moved to suppress evidence at trial on the
grounds of an unconstitutional search and seizure. 5 The trial
court denied the defendants' motion, and the superior court
affirmed.' Upon review, the issue before the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court was whether the defendants' rights had been vio-
lated under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution and section 8 of Article I of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.7
In Lewis, an Amtrak police officer utilized a drug courier
profile, which sets forth common characteristics of a drug couri-
er, in apprehending the defendants.' On two occasions, a ticket
agent informed the officer that the defendants had paid cash for
their tickets, wanted to return as soon as possible, were travel-
ling to New York City, had no luggage, and displayed large
amounts of cash.3" The Amtrak officer and three police officers
confronted the defendants.' During the course of questioning,
the officers searched the defendants for weapons and found that
31. Id.
32. 636 A.2d 619 (Pa. 1994).
33. See Lewis, 636 A.2d at 621.




38. Lewis, 636 A.2d at 621. The characteristics of the drug courier profile
were, "1) travel to and from an import city for illegal drugs .... 2) payment for
tickets in cash; 3) frequent trips with quick returns; 4) displays of large amounts of




one of the defendants was carrying a firearm.41 After their ar-
rest, a second search uncovered a package of cocaine.42
The defendants claimed that the officers lacked any probable
cause to warrant an investigatory stop or seizure, and thus, the
evidence obtained from the search should be suppressed.' The
supreme court concluded that, due to the nature of the confron-
tation, a seizure had in fact occurred." The only issue remain-
ing was whether "specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warranted that intrusion."' In examining the defendants' claim
under the United States Constitution, the court relied on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Sokolow" which approved the use of a drug courier profile. 7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the facts in the case
at bar did not rise to the same level of reasonable suspicion as
the facts in the Sokolow case." The court concluded that the
facts in this case did not evidence a drug courier any more than
an innocent traveler.'
The court concluded that under both the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitutions, the search and seizure was
unconstitutional.'s The court, therefore, granted the defendants'
41. Id. at 622.
42. id.
43. Lewis, 636 A.2d at 622. The court asserted that a seizure occurred when a
police officer restrained the liberty of an individual either by the use of force or a
show of authority. id. at 622-23 (citing Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980)).
44. Lewis, 636 A.2d at 623. In Florida v. Bostick the Supreme Court articulat-
ed the test for determining whether a seizure had taken place. See Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991). In utilizing this test, a court must examine all
the circumstances of the situation and determine whether the police officer's conduct
would have led a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to dismiss the
officer and leave the area. Lewis, 636 A.2d at 623 (citing Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435).
45. Lewis, 636 A.2d at 623 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
46. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
47. Lewis, 636 A.2d at 624. In Sokolow, the defendant: 1) paid $2,100 for two
airline tickets from a bundle of approximately $4,000; 2) used an alias; 3) was trav-
eling to Miami; 4) stayed in Miami only forty eight hours including twenty hours of
flight time; 5) appeared nervous; and 6) did not carry any luggage. Sokolow, 490
U.S. at 3.
48. Lewis, 636 A.2d at 624.
49. Id. In the present case, the defendants: 1) paid cash for train tickets on
two separate days from a large bundle of cash, costing $41.60 on one occasion; 2)
were not concerned with the increase in price for tickets to return as soon as possi-
ble; 3) travelled to New York City;, 4) carried no luggage; and 5) appeared nervous.
Id. at 621.
50. Id. at 625. The court noted that the seizure was unconstitutional under
the Pennsylvania Constitution because there was no probable cause for the search.
Id.
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motion to suppress the evidence. 1
The court noted that the officer's use of the drug courier pro-
file was not per se unreasonable, but a police officer must ob-
serve conduct on the part of an individual which gives rise to a
reasonable suspicion.52 This holding is significant in Pennsylva-
nia constitutional law because it will surely curtail, or at least
hamper, the use of the drug courier profile by law enforcement
personnel in Pennsylvania.
II. Governmental Immunity"
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT
CLAIMS ACT-REAL PROPERTY AND SIDEWALK EXCEPTION-Kiley
v. City of Philadelphia, 645 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that the City of Philadelphia was not
liable to a plaintiff who was injured in the street while avoiding
sidewalk construction because the street was not found to be
defective and the sidewalk did not cause the accident.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in Kiley v. City of
Philadelphia"' that the real property and sidewalk exceptions
to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (the "PSTCA")" did
not subject the City of Philadelphia to liability when it was
alleged that an individual who was forced to walk in the street
due to repairs being made on a city-owned sidewalk was struck
by a vehicle." In Kiley, a minor was permanently injured after
he was struck by a motor vehicle while walking in the street."'
The minor, through his parents and natural guardians, (the
"Appellees") filed suit against the City of Philadelphia (the
51. Id.
52. Id. The court noted that the profile should be only the starting point of an
investigation and should not replace independent observation of a suspect's behavior.
Id. at 624.
53. The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (the "PSTCA"), which provides
for general governmental immunity to political subdivisions of the Commonwealth,
was the subject of much activity in the Pennsylvania appellate courts in 1994. Par-
ticularly, the extent to which the real property and sidewalk exceptions to the
PSTCA would subject a political subdivision to liability was a highly contested issue.
Overall, the appellate courts tended to restrict the application of such exceptions in
favor of the political subdivisions. The following is a brief discussion of the 1994
Pennsylvania appellate court decisions regarding the real estate and sidewalk excep-
tions to the PSTCA.
54. 645 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1994)
55. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8541-64 (1982 & Supp. 1994).
56. Kiley, 645 A.2d at 186-87.
57. Id. at 185.
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"City") alleging that the minor was forced to walk in the street
because the City had negligently barricaded a sidewalk in a
demolition area without providing an alternative walkway.6
The Appellees therefore argued that the City was subject to
liability under the real property and sidewalk exceptions 9 to
the PSTCA.' The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the City on the basis that the condition of the sidewalk
was not a substantial factor in causing the accident because the
accident occurred forty-five to sixty feet from the demolition
area.6 The commonwealth court, however, reversed the grant
of summary judgment on the basis that the complaint had al-
leged facts sufficient to establish that the City's conduct in
maintaining the sidewalk and street created a dangerous condi-
tion which caused the minor's injuries, thereby subjecting the
City to liability under the real property and sidewalk exceptions
to the PSTCA 2
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania first addressed
the applicability of the real property exception to the PSTCAc
58. Id.
59. The real property and sidewalk exceptions to the PSTCA provide:
The following acts by a local agency or any of its employees may result in the
imposition of liability on a local agency:
(3) Real Property. - The care, custody or control of real property in the pos-
session of the local agency, except that the local agency shall not be liable for
damages on account of any injury sustained by a person intentionally trespass-
ing on real property in the possession of the local agency. A[s] used in this
paragraph, "real property" shall not include:
(i) trees, traffic signs, lights and other traffic controls, street lights and
street lighting systems;
(ii) facilities of steam, sewer, water, gas, and electric systems owned by
the local agency and located within rights-of-way;
(iii) streets; or
(iv) sidewalks.
(7) Sidewalks. - A dangerous condition of sidewalks within the rights-of-way
of streets owned by the local agency, except that the claimant to recover must
establish that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of
the kind of injury which was incurred and that the local agency had actual
notice or could reasonably be charged with notice under the circumstances of
the dangerous condition at a sufficient time prior to the event to have taken
measures to protect against the dangerous condition. When a local agency is
liable for damages under this paragraph by reason of its power and authority
to require installation and repair of sidewalks under the care, custody and
control of other persons, the local agency shall be secondarily liable only and
such other persons shall be primarily liable.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8542(b)(3), (7).
60. Kiley, 645 A.2d at 186.
61. Id. at 185.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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The court noted that the exception only applied when there was
both active negligence on the part of the political subdivision"4
and a dangerous condition of the land itself that caused the
injury." The court held that the real property exception did not
apply because the complaint did not allege that the street was
defective or that an artificial condition of the street caused the
accident."
The court then addressed whether the sidewalk exception was
applicable when it was alleged that an individual was forced to
walk on the street because of the condition of a sidewalk and
that individual was subsequently struck by a vehicle and in-
jured."7 The court explained that in order for the sidewalk ex-
ception to apply the artificial condition or defect in the land
itself must have caused the accident, not merely have facilitated
it." Therefore, the court contended that the Appellees had to
demonstrate that the sidewalk constituted a dangerous condition
and that the dangerous condition itself caused the accident. 9
The court concluded that because the minor was not injured
while using the sidewalk, the sidewalk did not cause the acci-
dent.70 Rather, the sidewalk at most facilitated the accident."
Accordingly, the supreme court reinstated the order of the trial
court that granted the City's motion for summary judgment.72
64. Id. (citing Crowell v. Philadelphia, 613 A.2d 1178 (Pa. 1992)).
65. Kiley, 645 A.2d at 185 (citing Snyder v. Harmiin, 562 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1989)).
66. Kiley, 645 A.2d at 187.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 186. (citing Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 523 A.2d 1118 (Pa.
1987) and Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1989)). The court also noted that it
would continue to interpret the PSTCA and Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity
statute consistently. Kiley, 645 A.2d at 186 (citing Crowell v. Philadelphia, 613 A.2d
1178 (Pa. 1992)); see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8521-22 (1982 & Supp. 1994)
(Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity statute).
69. Kiley, 645 A.2d at 187.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. Justice Cappy dissented on the grounds that the majority misconstrued
the court's prior decisions in Crowell and Mascaro and failed to adhere to traditional
concepts of causation in negligence actions. Id. at 188 (Cappy, J., dissenting). Justice
Cappy argued that Crowell simply stood for the proposition that the real property
exception to the PSTCA does not apply absent evidence demonstrating a causal
connection between the injury and the real property. Id. Justice Cappy contended
that in this case, the real property exception would apply if the appellees could es-
tablish the existence of a dangerous condition and that the dangerous condition
caused the minor's injuries. Id. Therefore, Justice Cappy opined that the jury should
determine whether a dangerous condition existed and, if so, whether the dangerous
condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury sustained by the
minor. Id. at 189.
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT
CLAIMS ACT-REAL PROPERTY AND SIDEWALK EXCEPTION-Finn
v. City of Philadelphia, 645 A.2d 320 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994)-The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that the
sidewalk exception to the PSTCA applies only to dangerous
conditions "of" sidewalks and not to dangerous conditions creat-
ed by substances "on" sidewalks.
In Finn v. City of Philadelphia," the appellee slipped and
fell on grease which had accumulated on a sidewalk owned by
the City of Philadelphia (the "City"). The appellee filed suit
against the City alleging that it had notice of a dangerous condi-
tion of a sidewalk and failed to correct the situation." The City
moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was immune
from liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act
(the "PSTCA"). 5 The trial court denied the motion and judg-
ment was ultimately entered in favor of the appellee."
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania ad-
dressed whether the sidewalk exception to the PSTCA, which
covered dangerous conditions "of" sidewalks applied to a danger-
ous condition created by a substance "on" the sidewalk.7 The
court first noted that its prior decisions regarding foreign sub-
stances on sidewalks were inconsistent. 8 The commonwealth
court asserted that it intended to resolve the controversy with
its opinion in Finn.7 9
Taking into consideration the plain language of the PSTCA,
the commonwealth court held that in cases involving the side-
walk exception to governmental immunity, liability would only
be imposed if the plaintiffs injury was caused by a defect or a
dangerous condition which originated from the negligent design
73. 645 A.2d 320 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
74. Finn, 645 A.2d at 321-22.
75. Id. at 322; see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8541-64.
76. Finn, 645 A.2d at 322.
77. Id.
78. Id. The court noted that the issue was:
[Wihether the sidewalk exception should be strictly construed to except from
immunity only those torts caused by a structural or integral defect of the
sidewalk or whether the sidewalk exception also imposes liability for torts
caused by the existence of foreign substances such as ice, snow, oil, or grease,
which can become attached to the sidewalk to the degree that they are only
removable by the application of some affirmative force.
Id. Compare Shubert v. Southeastern Pa. Trans. Auth., 625 A.2d 102 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1993) with Fitchett v. Southeastern Pa. Trans. Auth., 619 A.2d 805 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1992)).
79. Finn, 645 A.2d at 322.
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or construction of the sidewalk or by a defect in the internal
structural integrity of the sidewalk." The court emphasized
that it would no longer impose liability on a governmental entity
for failure to remove foreign substances, such as ice, snow, oil
and grease, from sidewalks.8 ' The court did, however, point out
that if the foreign substance accumulated on the sidewalk due to
a defect of the sidewalk the governmental entity could be lia-
ble.82
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-NEGLIGENCE-POLICE
CHASE-INJURY TO A THIRD PARTY-Foster v. City of Pittsburgh,
639 A.2d 929 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court held that a political subdivision could not be
held liable when an individual being pursued by the police negli-
gently collides with a vehicle driven by a third party.
In Foster v. City of Pittsburgh,' the appellant was injured
when a vehicle which was being chased by a Pittsburgh police
vehicle ran a red light and struck the appellant's vehicle.' The
appellant subsequently filed an action against the City of Pitts-
burgh (the "City") alleging that the police were negligent in
initiating and continuing a high speed pursuit and in failing to
sound a siren or other warning device." At the close of the
appellant's case-in-chief, the trial court granted the City's mo-
tion for a compulsory non-suit."
On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial court erred in
granting the non-suit because the evidence introduced at trial
was sufficient to create a question of fact for the jury as to
80. Id. at 325. The court noted that the same standard would apply in deter-
mining liability under the real property exception to the PSTCA. Id.
81. Finn, 645 A.2d'at 325, overruling Shubert v. Southeastern Pa. Trans.
Auth., 625 A.2d 102 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993); Giosa v. School District, 562 A.2d 411
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), allocatur denied, 578 A.2d 416 (Pa. 1990).
82. Finn, 645 A.2d at 325. President Judge Craig dissented on the basis that
the plain language of the statute did not impose liability only when the defect arose
out of the design, construction or internal defects in the real property or sidewalk.
Id. at 326 (Craig, J., dissenting). Particularly, Judge Craig stated that, "[tihe heart
of this exception to immunity is its focus upon a 'dangerous condition of sidewalks.'
The preposition used - 'of instead of 'on' - does not warrant confining the concept
of 'condition' solely to 'design, construction or internal defects,' as the majority opin-
ion would now do." Id. Accordingly, Judge Craig opined that a foreign substance
such as ice, oil or grease on a sidewalk or real property could constitute a danger-
ous condition under the sidewalk or real property exception to the PSTCA. Id. at
327.
83. 639 A.2d 929 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
84. Foster, 639 A.2d at 930.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 931.
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whether the City was negligent. 7 The commonwealth court re-
jected this argument, however, relying on the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania's decision in Dickens v. Horner," which held that
under the PSTCA, municipalities would not be liable for injuries
caused by the criminal acts of a third party." Therefore, the
court held that the criminal acts of the person being chased by
the police precluded the imposition of liability on the City."
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT
CLAIMS ACT-REAL PROPERTY EXCEPTION-LACK OF FALL PRO-
TECTION-Canizares v. City of Philadelphia, 639 A.2d 882 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
held that a lack of fall protection on a construction site was not
an artificial condition or defect in property to constitute a real
property exception under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims
Act.
In Canizares v. City of Philadelphia,9 a construction worker
(the "Appellant") filed suit against the City of Philadelphia (the
"City") for injuries sustained when he fell from a plank that was
being used as a walkway between two troughs on a city-owned
construction site.' The Appellant alleged that the City was
negligent in failing to provide "fall protection" at the site which
would have prevented the Appellant's injuries.' At the close of
the Appellant's case-in-chief, the trial court granted the City's
motion for a compulsory non-suit on the basis that the City was
87. Id. at 932.
88. 611 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1992).
89. Foster, 639 A.2d at 932 (citing Dickens v. Homer, 611 A.2d 693 (Pa.
1992)).
90. Id. at 932. Judge Smith dissented on the basis that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decision in Dickens did not give a municipality blanket immunity in
cases where an individual was injured by a third party fleeing from the police. Id.
at 933 (Smith, J., dissenting). Judge Smith relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decision in Crowell v. Philadelphia. Id. at 934 (citing Crowell v. Philadelphia,
613 A.2d 1178 (Pa. 1992)). In Crowell, the court held that the criminal conduct of a
third party was not a per se superseding cause and the question of whether such
criminal conduct rose to the level of a superseding cause should be taken to the
jury. Crowell, 613 A.2d at 1184. Judge Smith recognized that the Dickens and
Crowell decisions appeared to be inconsistent, but asserted that until the supreme
court resolved the controversy, the commonwealth court should follow the most logi-
cal and rationale expression of the law. Foster, 639 A.2d at 934 (Smith, J., dissent-
ing). This, opined Judge Smith, would not be to automatically grant municipalities
immunity from suit simply because a criminal act was involved. Id.
91. 639 A.2d 882 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
92. Canizares, 639 A.2d at 883.
93. Id.
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immune from suit under the PSTCA.'
On appeal, the commonwealth court held that a lack of fall
protection was not realty, and consequently, the Appellant had
failed to establish that the lack of fall protection constituted an
artificial condition or defect in the property necessary to be an
exception to the PSTCA 5 Moreover, the court held that the
Appellant had failed to establish a defect in the trough itself."
Therefore, the commonwealth court affirmed the trial court's
refusal to remove the compulsory non-suit.97
III. Tort Law
A. PRODUCT LIABILITY
PRODUCT LIABILITY-STATUTE OF REPOSE-MANU-
FACTURERS-IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY-McConnaughey
v. Building Components, Inc., 637 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1994)-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a manufacturer who only
supplies a defective product which is incorporated into an im-
provement to real property is not protected by the Pennsylvania
Statute of Repose.
In McConnaughey v. Building Components, Inc.," the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court addressed whether the Pennsylvania
Statute of Repose (the "Statute of Repose")" applied to manu-
94. Id. (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8541-42 (1982)).
95. Canizares, 639 A.2d at 887.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 637 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1994).
99. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5536 (1981 & Supp. 1994). This section provides in
pertinent part:
[A] civil action or proceeding brought against any person lawfully performing
or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction,
or construction of any improvement to real property must be commenced with-
in 12 years after completion of construction of such improvement to recover
damages for:
(1) Any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision or observation of
construction, or construction of the improvement.
(2) Injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such deficien-
cy.
(3) Injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such
deficiency.
(4) Contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of any
injury mentioned in paragraph (2) or (3).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5536.
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facturers whose products were incorporated into improvements
in real property." In McConnaughey, Floyd McConnaughey
(the "Appellant") had purchased, in 1970, pre-fabricated roof
trusses from Building Components, Inc. (the "Appellee") and
incorporated them into a barn which was constructed on the
Appellant's property.' The Appellee manufactured the roof
trusses but did not specifically manufacture them to the order or
specification of the Appellant.'
In 1986, thirty-seven of the Appellant's dairy cows were killed
when the roof of the barn collapsed." Appellant subsequently
filed suit against the Appellee alleging that the Appellee was
negligent in the manufacture of the roof trusses and that the
roof trusses were defectively constructed.'0" The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee on the basis
that the action was barred by Pennsylvania's Statute of Repose
regarding construction projects. 5 The Appellant appealed to
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania arguing that the Appellee
was not within the class which was protected by the Statute of
Repose."°
The issue before the court was whether the Statute of Repose
applied to all manufacturers of products that were incorporated
into improvements to real property. 7 Applying the plain lan-
guage of section 5536, the supreme court held that a manufac-
turer who only supplied a defective product which was subse-
quently incorporated into an improvement to real property was
not protected by the Statute of Repose. 8 The court explained
that the Statute of Repose did not apply to manufacturers and
suppliers of products.'" Rather, the Statute of Repose applied
only to those who performed acts of "individual expertise" simi-
lar in nature to those commonly performed by builders. 0
Nevertheless, the supreme court held that summary judgment
was not appropriate at that point because the extent to which
the Appellee was involved in the planning, design or construc-
tion of the barn was in dispute."





105. McConnaughey, 637 A.2d at 1333.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1332.
108. Id. at 1334.
109. Id.
110. McConnaughey, 637 A.2d at 1334.
111. Id. at 1335. For a further discussion of the decision in McConnaughey, see
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PRODUCT LIABILITY-STATUTE OF REPOSE-MANU-
FACTURERs-IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY-Noll v. Harris-
burg YMCA, 643 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that a manufacturer who supplies individual
expertise is protected by the Pennsylvania Statute of Repose.
The court further held that in determining whether a product is
an improvement to real property, the objective intent of the
parties controls.
In Noll v. Harrisburg YMCA," Noll (the "Appellant") dove
from a starting block into three and one-half feet of water at a
YMCA swimming pool and, as a result, was rendered a quadri-
plegic." 3 The Appellant filed suit against the manufacturer of
the starting block, under a strict product liability theory. 14
Three years after the complaint was initially filed, the manufac-
turer filed a Motion for Leave to Amend their New Matter to
include the Pennsylvania Statute of Repose (the "Statute of
Repose") 15 as an affirmative defense." 6 The trial court de-
nied the motion on the basis that the starting blocks were not
an improvement to real property and, therefore, did not fall
within the purview of the Statute of Repose." 7
The manufacturer appealed this decision to the superior court
which remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine whether the YMCA intended the starting blocks to be an
improvement to the real property."8 The manufacturer subse-
quently appealed the superior court's decision to the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court."
19
After determining that the trial court's denial of the
manufacturer's motion was a final appealable order, the su-
preme court was confronted with several issues.' The first is-
sue was whether the manufacturer was protected by the Statute
of Repose in light of the supreme court's decision in
McConnaughey v. Building Components." The second issue
Paul R. Naim, Recent Decision, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 755 (1995).
112. 643 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1994).
113. Noll, 643 A.2d at 83.
114. Ic.




119. Noll, 643 A.2d at 83.
120. Id. at 84.




was whether the starting blocks in question constituted improve-
ments to real property within the meaning of the Statute of Re-
pose.
2 2
In resolving the first issue, the court emphasized that in de-
termining whether a supplier or manufacturer was within the
purview of the Statute of Repose, the inquiry had to focus on
whether the manufacturer supplied any "individual exper-
tise."' 2 Accordingly, the court emphasized that manufacturers
were not per se outside the purview of the statute.'2
The court determined that the manufacturer in this case had
supplied "individual expertise," because the manufacturer was
required to examine the drawings of the swimming pool and
determine whether its product, with modifications, was suitable
for the improvement. 12 However, the court contended that its
holding was limited to the unique facts of the case, and that a
manufacturer who simply shipped goods "per specifications" or
"per your drawings" would not automatically be protected by the
Statute of Repose. 26
In determining whether the starting blocks in question were
improvements within the meaning of the Statute of Repose, the
court considered three factors. The first factor was whether the
improvement was permanently attached to the realty.'27 The
second factor examined was the extent to which the product was
necessary to the use of the real property." The third factor
was whether the parties intended to make a permanent addition
to the realty.'29
The supreme court disagreed with the superior court's holding
that the parties' subjective intent to make a permanent addition
to realty was controlling."" Rather, the supreme court held
that the objective intent of the parties had to be considered in
determining whether an object was a fixture for the purposes of
the Statute of Repose."'
The court then noted that upon review of the record, the trial
court had not abused its discretion in holding that the diving
122. Noll, 643 A.2d at 87.
123. Id. at 86 (citing McConnaughey, 637 A.2d at 1334).
124. Noll, 643 A.2d at 86.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 86 n.5.
127. Id. at 87 (citing Gore v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 537 A.2d 913 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1988), allocatur denied, 546 A.2d 60 (Pa. 1989)).
128. Noll, 643 A.2d at 87.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 88.
131. Id.
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platforms were not improvements."'2 Accordingly, the supreme




TY-REMOVAL OF SAFETY DEVICE-WARNINGS-Davis v. Berwind
Corp., 640 A.2d 1289 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)-The Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that because an employer's removal of a
safety device is not reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer
it constitutes a superseding cause of the employee's injuries.
In Davis v. Berwind Corp.,"M the appellee lost three fingers
on her right hand after she reached into the discharge chute of a
meat blender which she was operating."3 The meat blender
was manufactured with a safety device that was designed to
prevent such accidents and was also equipped with the following
warning, "Danger Keep Fingers Out of Door Openings.""'
Moreover, the operator's manual to the meat blender included a
specific warning against the removal of the safety device. 3 ' In
order to increase productivity, the appellee's employer removed
the safety device which was manufactured and sold with the
blender." The parties stipulated that the accident would not
have occurred had the safety device not been removed. 3 '
The appellee filed suit against the manufacturer of the meat
blender under a strict product liability theory."'0 The appellee
contended that the blender lacked adequate warnings because it
was foreseeable that the employer would remove the safety de-
vice and the user would not be aware of the danger. 4' The tri-
al court denied the manufacturer's motion for a non-suit and the
jury subsequently returned a verdict against the manufactur-
er.
142
The manufacturer appealed to the superior court arguing,
inter alia, that the removal of the safety device constituted a
substantial post-sale alteration of the meat blender for which
132. Id. at 89.
133. Noll, 643 A.2d at 89.
134. 640 A.2d 1289 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).




139. Id. at 1292-93.
140. Davis, 640 A.2d at 1292-93.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1293.
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the manufacturer should not be held responsible.'" The appel-
lee contended that the removal of the safety device was foresee-
able and that the manufacturer was, therefore, still subject to
liability.'" The issue before the superior court was whether
the manufacturer had a duty to anticipate that a user would
modify its product and whether the manufacturer had a duty to
warn against such modifications.45
The court noted that manufacturers could be liable under a
strict product liability theory if a substantial change to the prod-
uct was reasonably foreseeable." Moreover, the court asserted
that whether the change was foreseeable was a question for the
trier of fact, except where the inferences were so clear that a
court could determine as a matter of law that a reasonable man-
ufacturer could not have foreseen the alteration.'
The court contended that to hold the manufacturer responsi-
ble in this case would be an endorsement of the employer's ac-
tion and would leave no incentive for the employer to heed the
manufacturer's safety precautions or the Commonwealth's
health and safety laws.'" The court asserted that under the
circumstances of this case, the trial court should have made a
threshold determination that it was not reasonably foreseeable
to the manufacturer that the safety device would be re-
moved."' The court held that a post-sale substantial alter-
ation, which the manufacturer had warned against, constituted
a superseding cause.'" Therefore, the court concluded that the
manufacturer could not be held liable for the injuries to the
employee."'
143. Id. at 1294.
144. Id.
145. Davis, 640 A.2d at 1299.
146. Id. at 1297 (citing Eck v. Powermatic Houdaille, 527 A.2d 1012, 1019 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987)).
147. Davis, 640 A.2d at 1297 (citing D'Antona v. Hampton Grinding Wheel Co.,
310 A.2d 307, 310 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973)).
148. Davis, 640 A.2d at 1299.
149. Id. at 1300.
150. Id.
151. Id. Justice Ford Elliot dissented on the basis that "foreseeability" was a
determination which was generally made by the trier of fact and that, in this case,
the facts provided a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that the modification of
the blender was foreseeable. Id. at 1301 (Ford Elliot, J., dissenting). Justice Ford
Elliot emphasized that .the majority's holding was inconsistent with a prior case in
which the court held that post-sale modification alone was insufficient to relieve a
manufacturer of liability and that courts must consider the foreseeability of that
modification. Id. at 1303 (quoting Eck v. Powermatic Houdaille, 527 A.2d 1012, 1018
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)).
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B. SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY
SOCIAL HOST LiABILITY-MINORS SERVING ALCOHOL TO MI-
NORS-Kapres v. Heller, 640 A.2d 888 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that a minor who furnishes alcohol to
another minor owes no duty to that minor and therefore is not
liable when the minor guest is injured as a result of his intoxi-
cation.
In Kapres v. Heller,'2 a nineteen year old college student at
Clarion University (the "Appellant"), consumed alcohol at three
different parties which were hosted by minor college students
(the "Appellees").'" After leaving the last party, the Appellant
was struck by an automobile and sustained various physical
injuries." It was subsequently determined that the Appellant
had a blood alcohol content of 0.196% at the time of the acci-
dent.155
The Appellant filed suit against, inter alia, the minor Appel-
lees for negligently serving him alcohol." The Appellant al-
leged that his consumption of alcohol and visibly intoxicated
condition were the proximate cause of his accident. 7
The trial court granted summary judgment to all the minor
Appellees on the basis that they owed no duty to the minor
Appellant.' The Appellant appealed to the superior court as-
serting that, under the supreme court's holding in Congini v.
Portersville Valve Co.," 9 the minor Appellees owed him a duty
and that the trial court, therefore, erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of the Appellees."®
The superior court affirmed the judgment of the trial court
and the Appellant appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. 6' The issue presented to the supreme court was wheth-
er a minor could be liable under the social host doctrine for pro-
viding alcohol to another minor who was injured as the result of
152. 640 A.2d 888 (Pa. 1994).
153. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 889.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 890.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 890.
159. 470 A.2d-515 (Pa. 1983).
160. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 890. In Congini, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that an adult social host who served alcohol to minor guests could be liable to
those guests for the consequences of their consumption of alcohol. Congini, 470 A.2d
at 517.
161. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 890.
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being intoxicated from such alcohol."6 2
The court explained that Congini did not apply because in
Congini, adults were held liable for furnishing alcohol to mi-
nors." The court noted that under the rule set forth in
Congini, the minor's contributory negligence also had to be con-
sidered.1 ' In this case, where the Appellant and Appellees
were both minors, the court explained that the parties were all
responsible for their own actions in providing or consuming alco-
hol. 5' Hence, the court held that a minor social host did not
owe a duty to his minor guests with regard to furnishing or
consuming alcohol.1'
SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY-PARENTAL LIABILITY-NEGLI-
GENCE-CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL,--CIL LIABILITY-Maxwell
v. Keas, 639 A.2d 1215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)-The Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that a seventeen year-old child was consid-
ered an adult and therefore the parents could not be held civilly
liable when that child consumes their alcohol and murders an-
other individual.
In Maxwell v. Keas, 6 7 seventeen year-old Kimberly Keas
stabbed and killed Kenneth Maxwell in her parent's house after
the two had consumed Kimberly's parent's alcohol. 68
Kimberly's parents were away on vacation at the time."8 The
administratrix of the decedent's estate filed suit against
Kimberly's parents (the "Appellees") for negligence. 7 ' The
estate alleged that the Appellees should have known that their
daughter was addicted to alcohol and should have prevented her
from gaining access to it.1' The trial court subsequently grant-
ed summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. 2
On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
trial court on the basis that because Kimberly was an adult, the
162. Id. at 889.
163. Id. at 891.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6308(a) (1993)).
166. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 891. Justice Papadakos filed a dissenting opinion ar-
guing that because a minor was potentially criminally liable for providing other
minors with alcohol, they should also be held civilly liable. Id. at 891 (Papadakos,
J., dissenting) (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6308(a) (1993)).
167. 639 A.2d 1215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
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Appellees had no duty to constantly supervise her activities.'73
Moreover, the superior court asserted that social host liability
could not apply. 74 The court noted that social host liability re-
quired that the host "knowingly furnish" alcohol. 7 ' The court
indicated that actual, rather than imputed knowledge was nec-
essary to satisfy the standard.7 In this case, the Appellees did
not know that the decedent would be in their home as Kimberly
was specifically instructed not to have visitors while her parents
were away.'77 Moreover, Kimberly was prohibited from con-
suming her parents' alcohol.'78 Accordingly, the court held that
the Appellees could not be held vicariously liable for the actions
of their daughter.'79
C. WRONGFUL ADOPTION AND NEGLIGENT PLACEMENT
OF AN ADOPTIVE CHILD
WRONGFUL ADOPTION-NEGLIGENT PLACEMENT OF ADOPTIVE
CHILD-CAUSES OF ACTION-Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa.
1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an adoptive
parent may allege causes of action for the wrongful adoption and
negligent placement of an adoptive child including intentional
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, negligent failure
to disclose information and failure to investigate the health of
the adopted child in good faith.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized wrongful
adoption and negligent placement of adoptive child as valid
causes of action in tort in Gibbs v. Ernst."8 In Gibbs, Frank
and Jane Gibbs (the "Appellees") adopted a five year-old boy who
began to display extremely violent and abusive behavior towards
others immediately after adoption."5 ' Subsequently, the Appel-
lees filed suit against Concern Professional Services for Children
and Youth, a private adoption agency, and Northampton Chil-
dren and Youth, (collectively the "Appellants") for wrongful
173. Maxwell, 639 A.2d at 1218 (quoting Alioto v. Marnell, 520 N.E.2d 1284,
1285-86 (Mass. 1988)). The court concluded that although Kimberly was below the
legal drinking age, she was considered an adult. Maxwell, 639 A.2d at 1218-19.
174. Maxwell, 639 A.2d at 1218.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1217 (quoting Alumni Ass'n v. Sullivan, 572 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa.
1990)).
177. Maxwell, 639 A.2d at 1218.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994).
181. Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 885.
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adoption and negligent placement of an adoptive child.' 2 The
trial court granted the Appellant's preliminary objections in the
nature of a demurrer, which was subsequently reversed by the
commonwealth court.'
The supreme court granted allocatur to address the issue of
whether Pennsylvania law recognizes causes of action for wrong-
ful adoption and negligent placement of an adoptive child.' "
The Appellees alleged that they made repeated requests for a
child who had no history of sexual or physical abuse or any
mental or emotional problems, and that they made repeated
demands for all information regarding the child's psychological
and emotional history."s The Appellees further alleged that
despite such demands, the Appellants failed to disclose informa-
tion in their possession which indicated that the child had been
sexually and physically abused as a young child and that the
child had an extensive history of aggression and hostility toward
others.'
The supreme court first addressed whether common law caus-
es of actions could apply to adoptions. 87 The court explained
that although the Pennsylvania Adoption Act (the "Adoption
Act") had to be strictly construed, there was nothing in the
Adoption Act which precluded the application of traditional
common law principles to the adoption setting.189 The court
further opined that had the legislature intended for the Adop-
tion Act to provide adoption agencies with immunity, it would
have expressly provided for such immunity in the Adoption
Act. 9 ' Moreover, the court asserted that the common law caus-
es of action for fraud and negligence were so well established
that only affirmative action on the part of the legislature would
prevent their application.'
182. id. at 886.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 885.
186. Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 885-86.
187. Id. at 886.
188. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2101-2910 (1993). Section 2533 of the Adoption Act
of 1970 provides that the adoption intermediary must provide a report to the adopt-
ing parents which includes "[a] statement that medical history was obtained and if
not obtained, a statement of the reason therefor." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2533(b)(12).
In addition, section 2909 of the Adoption Act requires that "[mledical history infor-
mation shall, where practicable, be delivered by the attending physician or other
designated person to the intermediary who shall deliver such information to the
adopting parents or their physician." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2909(a).
189. Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 888-89.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 889.
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The court then followed the lead of several sister states and
held that the Appellees' intentional misrepresentation claim,
was cognizable. 9" Because the Appellees sufficiently pleaded
the elements of intentional misrepresentation, the court held
that the Appellees were entitled to proceed to trial on an inten-
tional misrepresentation theory. 93
The court also held that there was a cause of action for negli-
gent misrepresentation in the adoption context.9 4 Once again,
the court based its holding on the position of several sister
states and the fact that the tort of negligent misrepresentation
had long been established in the Commonwealth.'95 The court
emphasized, however, that adoption agencies were not
warrantors or insurers of an adoptive child's health, and that
the agency's liability was limited to reasonably foreseeable con-
ditions at the time of placement.'" Because the Appellees suf-
ficiently pleaded a cause of action for negligent misrepresenta-
tion, the supreme court allowed them to proceed to trial on that
theory.
197
The court also addressed the issue of whether a cause of ac-
tion existed for negligently failing to disclose information about
the child.'98 The court explained that negligence could only be
asserted where one party owed a duty to the other party.'
The court noted that the Adoption Act created an affirmative
duty on the part of the adoption agency to fully disclose to the
prospective parents all the information it had obtained." Al-
ternatively, the court held that the relationship between the
adoption agency and the prospective parents gave rise to such a
duty.0 1 The court therefore held that the tort of negligent fail-
ure to disclose was cognizable in an adoption context.0 2 The
court did note, however, that negligent failure to disclose would
only be found where the agency failed to fully disclose the infor-
192. Id. (citing Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, 201 Cal. App. 3d 859
(1988); Reidy v. Albany County Dep't of Social Services, 598 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1993) and
Burr v. Board of County Comm'r, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (1986)).
193. Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 890.
194. Id. at 891.
195. Id. at 890-91 (citing Roe v. Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992); M.H. v. Caritas Family Services, 488 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1992) and
Meracle v. Children's Service Society, 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989)).
196. Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 891.




201. Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 892.
202. Id. at 893.
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mation in its possession after a reasonable investigation of its
records.'
Finally, the court addressed the issue of the validity of the
Appellee's cause of action for failing to investigate the child's
mental and physical health.' The court indicated that the
case law of Pennsylvania and Pennsylvania's sister states was
devoid of any authority for the creation of a duty of reasonable
investigation."5 Moreover, the court held that the Adoption Act
simply created a duty to make a good faith effort to obtain the
medical records of the adoptive child, not to make a reasonable
investigation.0" Ultimately, the court declined to create a duty
on the part of the adoption agency to investigate the background
of an adoptive child."7 Accordingly, the court refused to allow
the Appellees to proceed to trial on such a theory.0 '
D. ABSOLUTE NUISANCE AND RES IPSA LoQuITUR
NEGLIGENCE-RES IPSA LOQUITUR-RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
SECTION 328D-ABSOLUTE NUISANCE-Smith v. King's Grant
Condominium, 640 A.2d 1276 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that in order to establish the theory of res
ipsa loquitur a plaintiff must show that her actions could not
have been the cause of the injury. Also, in order to allege liabili-
ty based on the theory of absolute nuisance, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care.
In Smith v. King's Grant Condominium,..9 Smith (the "Ap-
pellant") sued King's Grant Condominium (the "Appellee") on a
negligence theory when a sewer line backed up into the
Appellant's apartment causing it to be flooded with bathroom
sewage."10 The trial court granted a compulsory nonsuit on the
grounds that the Appellant failed to show that a trespass oc-
curred on her property from property owned or possessed by
another, and on the grounds that the Appellant failed to estab-




206. Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 893-94.
207. Id. at 894. The court contended that the imposition of a duty to investi-
gate, "would strain resources of adoptive intermediaries and reduce the number of
adoptions." Id.
208. Id.
209. 640 A.2d 1276 (Pa. 1994).
210. Smith, 640 A.2d at 1277.
211. Id. at 1278.
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superior court affirmed the trial court on the grounds that the
Appellant failed to prove negligence under the Restatement of
Torts.212 The court stated that res ipsa loquitur was not appli-
cable because Appellant failed to eliminate herself or others as
possible causes of the back-up, and the doctrine of absolute nui-
sance was also not available because it had not been plead-
ed.
213
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed and
asserted that in order to prove absolute nuisance under section
364(c) of the Restatement of Torts, the Appellant was required
to establish that the condominium did not exercise reasonable
care.214 Further, under section 328D of the Restatement,15
res ipsa loquitur, the court contended that the Appellant had to
prove that neither she nor third parties were the cause of the
alleged harm.21 ' The supreme court noted that the Appellant's
trial counsel appeared to take the position that all that was re-
quired to be proved was that the Appellee condominium main-
tained an artificial condition and that the Appellant was harmed
212. Id. Section 364 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Creation or Mainte-
nance of Dangerous Artificial Conditions, provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability to others outside of the land for
physical harm caused by a structure or other artificial condition on the land,
which the possessor realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable
risk of such harm, if
(a) the possessor has created the condition, or
(b) the condition is created by a third person with the possessor's con-
sent or acquiescence while the land is in his possession, or
(c) the condition is created by a third person without the possessor's
consent or acquiescence, but reasonable care is not taken to make the
condition safe after the possessor knows or should know of it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 364 (1965).
213. Smith, 640 A.2d at 1278.
214. Id. at 1279.
215. Section 328D of the Restatement (second) of Torts provides:
§ 328 D. Res Ipsa Loquitur
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by negli-
gence of the defendant when
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and
third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty
to the plaintiff.
(2) It is the function of the court to determine whether the inference may rea-
sonably be drawn by the jury, or whether it must necessarily be drawn.
(3) It is the function of the jury to determine whether the inference is to be
drawn in any case where different conclusions may be reached.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965).
216. Smith, 640 A.2d at 1279.
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by it. 217 However, the court held that because the Appellant
failed to demonstrate that she could not be the cause of the




LIABILITY CATASTROPHE Loss FuND-King v. Boettcher, 645
A.2d 219 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund is
required to pay post-judgment interest on a medical malpractice
claim.
In King v. Boettcher,219 the plaintiff brought a wrongful
death and survival action against the defendant doctor for the
death of the plaintiffs wife."0 On March 30, 1987, the plaintiff
was awarded damages of $500,000.2 The defendant's insur-
ance paid a total of $265,054.32 to the plaintiff, which consisted
of the policy limit of $100,000, delay damages of $54,390.82 and
217. Id. at 1279-80.
218. Id. at 1280. Justice Montemuro dissented from the majority opinion argu-
ing that a compulsory nonsuit should not have been granted. Id. at 1281
(Montemuro, J., dissenting). Justice Montemuro further argued that the majority
ignored the fact that pursuant to section 328(D)(1)(b) of the Restatement, the Appel-
lant only had to present evidence from which a jury would reasonably conclude that
the negligence more probably than not was that of the Appellee. Id. Justice
Montemuro contended that the Appellant was not required to exclude all other possi-
ble causes beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In the light most favorable to the Appel-
lant, the fact that the sewer lines in the condominium had backed up on at least 20
prior incidents was evidence that the back-ups were not simply the result of the
negligence of individual residents, but rather the negligence of the Appellee condo-
minium. Id. at 1281-82. Therefore, the dissent asserted that the Appellant had suffi-
ciently eliminated other possible causes and should have been allowed to proceed
under a res ipsa loquitur theory. Id. at 1282.
Justice Montemuro also opined that the Appellant adequately set forth a
claim under an absolute nuisance theory. He asserted that because the Appellant
only needed to show that sewage from the Appellee's land traveled onto the
Appellant's land and that the Appellant suffered harm as a result. Id. Regardless of
whether the Appellant erroneously used the term negligence in her pleadings, the
record indicated that the claim was based on absolute nuisance. Id. The mistake
was excusable in light of the fact that the correct theory under which to proceed
had not yet been clearly articulated by the court. Id. at 1282-83. Moreover, the
confusion regarding the appropriate theory under which to bring this action gave
notice to all parties that any applicable theory of tort would be considered. Id. In
effect, Justice Montemuro contended that the majority was placing form over sub-
stance. Id. at 1283.
219. 645 A.2d 219 (Pa. 1994).
.220. King, 645 A.2d at 220.
221. Id.
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post-judgment interest of $110,655.50. 2
On April 3, 1990, the trial court molded the verdict to include
additional delay damages, and the court accordingly entered a
judgment in the amount of $674,873.27." a On December 31,
1990, the Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund
(the "CAT Fund"), a statutorily created fund which acts as a
secondary insurer in medical malpractice cases, paid the plain-
tiff $520,475.00.2
Subsequently, the plaintiff sought post-judgment interest on
the $520,475.00 from the defendant, the defendant's insurer or
the CAT Fund." The defendant brought a declaratory judg-
ment action in commonwealth court for a determination of
whether the plaintiff was entitled to post-judgment interest and,
if so, who was liable. 6 In response, the commonwealth court
determined that the CAT Fund was liable to the plaintiff for the
payment of post-judgment interest.2
7
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed
whether the Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss
Fund could be held liable for post-judgment interest.2  The
court concluded that because there was no statutory provision
which exempted the CAT Fund from post-judgment interest, any
damages paid by the CAT Fund were subject to post-judgment
interest as provided by the Judicial Code."5 The court ac-
knowledged that the legislature might not have intended the
CAT fund to pay post-judgment interest.230 The court noted,
however, that the legislature could amend the statute to exempt








229. Id. at 221. Title 42, section 8101 provides that, "a judgment for a specific
sum of money shall bear interest at the lawful rate from the date of the verdict or
award, or from the date of the judgment, if the judgment is not entered upon a ver-
dict or award." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8101 (1993).




F. ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK
ASSUMPTION OF THE RisK-Hardy v. Southland Corp., 645 A.2d
839 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Superior Court
held that in determining whether the plaintiff assumed the risk
of the defendant's conduct, Pennsylvania courts should apply a
modified version of the assumption of the risk doctrine that
would be adopted by a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.
In Hardy v. Southland Corp., 2 the appellant filed suit
against the appellee for injuries sustained after she slipped and
fell on a wet floor at the appellee's store.2' The trial court
granted the appellee's motion for a nonsuit on the basis-that the
appellant assumed the risk of injury because she glanced at the
wet floor and noticed that it was wet just prior to falling.'
On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the
facts of this case did not warrant the application of assumption
of risk as an affirmative defense.235  More importantly,
however, the superior court addressed the confused status of the
defense of assumption of risk in Pennsylvania."' The court
made reference to two leading Pennsylvania Supreme Court
opinions which purported to abolish the doctrine of assumption
of risk as an affirmative defense, yet both of which failed to gain
the support of a majority of the court. 7
The superior court explained that in the supreme court's opin-
ion in Howell v. Clyde, 8 two justices supported a modified
version of the doctrine of assumption of risk which incorporated
that doctrine into a duty analysis. 9 Two other justices con-
curred in this result.' Finally, two justices opined that the
doctrine of assumption of risk should be eliminated altogether as
an affirmative defense.' The superior court noted that the is-
231. Id.
232. 645 A.2d 839 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
233. Hardy, 645 A.2d at 839.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 841.
236. Id.
237. Id. See Howell v. Clyde, 620 A.2d 1107 (Pa. 1993); Rutter v. Northeastern
Beaver County School District, 437 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1981).
238. 620 A.2d 1107 (Pa. 1993).
239. Hardy, 645 A.2d at 841-42 (citing Howell v. Clyde, 620 A.2d 1107, 1113
(Pa. 1993)).
240. Hardy, 645 A.2d at 841.
241. Id.
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sue was whether it was bound by a prior supreme court decision
that had not been expressly overruled but was not supported by
a majority of the court. 2
The court relied on the rationale of the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey," s which in turn relied on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Marks v. Unites States.2" In
Planned Parenthood, the Third Circuit determined that when a
legal standard was no longer supported by a majority of the
court it ceased to be the law and the law to be applied was "that
which the Justices concur upon on the narrowest grounds."'
The superior court therefore concluded that it was obligated to
apply the modified version of the doctrine of assumption of risk
because the modified version was most likely to gain at least a
concurrence of the majority of the supreme court.'- Neverthe-
less, the superior court concluded that an application of the
modified doctrine to the facts of Hardy led to the same conclu-
sion as the court had reached under the original doctrine.'
Specifically, the court held that under the circumstances, it
could not be said that the appellee owed no duty to the appel-
lant to keep its floor dry or otherwise safe.'
IV. Criminal Law
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANC-
ES-SUMMARY OFFENSES-Commonwealth v. Roland, 637 A.2d
269 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a
warrantless search and seizure of evidence based on an exigent
circumstance that is a minor or summary offense is not justified.
In Commonwealth v. Roland," the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania restricted the police's ability to use exigent circum-
stances as grounds for a warrantless search.2" The defendant
was convicted of providing alcohol to minors and possessing
242. Id. at 842.
243. 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991).
244. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
245. Hardy, 645 A.2d at 842 (citing Planned Parenthood, 947 F.2d at 693).
246. Hardy, 645 A.2d at 842.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 842-43.
249. 637 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1994).
250. Roland, 637 A.2d at 270.
1995
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 33:523
marijuana and drug paraphernalia." An individual informed
the police that he had attended a party at the defendant's home
at which minors were consuming alcohol and using marijua-
na.25 When the police arrived, they observed several minors
attempting to conceal beer cans.2"'
Acting on their belief that underage drinking was.in progress,
the police officers searched the defendant's home and found a
quantity of beer and marijuana, and a marijuana pipe.'
Claiming that the evidence was obtained by an illegal search,
the defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence.' The
trial court found that the search of the defendant's home was
justified by exigent circumstances, and the superior court af-
firmed this decision.'se
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asserted that a
search and a seizure in a private home in the absence of a war-
rant was presumptively unreasonable."? However, the court
noted that if probable cause and exigent circumstances were
present, a warrantless search of a home could be constitutionally
permissible.' The court explained that the Commonwealth
bore the burden of showing that exigent circumstances existed to





255. Roland, 637 A.2d at 270. The evidence was not suppressed and the defen-
dant was convicted. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987)). The court noted
that the proper standard of review of a suppression ruling was whether the trial
court's findings of fact were supported by the record and whether the legal conclu-
sions drawn therefrom were correct. Roland, 637 A.2d at 270 (citing Commonwealth
v. Cortez, 491 A.2d 111, 112 (Pa. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 950 (1985)).
258. Roland, 637 A.2d at 270 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
The Court stated that the factors to be considered in determining whether exigent
circumstances existed were as follows:
1) the gravity of the offense, 2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to
be armed, 3) whether there is above and beyond a clear showing of probable
cause, 4) whether there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is within
the premises being entered, 5) whether there is a likelihood that the suspect
will escape if not swiftly apprehended, 6) whether the entry was peaceable,
and 7) the time of entry ....
Roland, 637 A.2d at 270-71 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wagner, 406 A.2d 1026, 1031
(Pa. 1979)). The court further contended that other factors could also be considered
including whether the police were in pursuit of a fleeing suspect, the likelihood that
the suspect would destroy evidence before a warrant could be obtained, and the
dangers to police officers or other persons located near the dwelling. Roland, 637
A.2d at 271.
259. Roland, 637 A.2d at 271 (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750-
53 (1984)).
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The supreme court noted that because underage drinking was
a summary offense it was only minor in nature.' The court
disagreed with the prosecution that a warrantless search was
justified on the basis of a minor underlying offense."' The
court found that the facts did not otherwise demonstrate any
exigent circumstances that would support a warrantless search
of the defendant's home."2 Thus, the court concluded that the
trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence was erroneous.' This decision makes clear that the
Commonwealth will no longer be able to justify warrantless
searches and seizures on the grounds of exigent circumstances
when the underlying offense is a minor or summary one.
CRIMINAL LAW-CAPITAL SENTENCING-RIGHT TO AP-
PEAL-FAILURE TO APPEAR-Commonwealth v. Kindler, 639 A.2d
1 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a
fugitive defendant is not entitled to renew post-conviction relief
motions of a death sentence when the defendant was a fugitive
at the time of the post-verdict hearing.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down a decision
in Commonwealth v. Kindler" which will severely affect the
disposition of post-verdict motions filed by individuals who are
fugitives from justice. After a jury trial the defendant was con-
victed on charges of first degree murder, kidnapping, and crimi-
nal conspiracy." The jury found that two aggravating circum-
stances were involved in the murder and imposed the death
sentence.'" While the defendant's post-verdict motions were
pending, the defendant escaped from a maximum security deten-
tion center. 7 The Commonwealth filed a petition to dismiss
the motions, and the trial court granted the Commonwealth's
petition on the grounds that the defendant waived his right to
have his motions considered when he fled the jurisdiction.'
Eight years later, the defendant was captured and returned to
Pennsylvania, and he appealed his sentence. 9 The supreme
260. Roland, 637 A.2d at 271.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 272.
263. Id.
264. 639 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1994).
265. Kindler, 639 A.2d at 2.
266. Id. No mitigating circumstances were found, therefore the jury was re-
quired to fix a sentence of death. Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(cXlXiv) (Supp.
1994).
267. Kindler, 639 A.2d at 2.
268. Id.
269. Id. The defendant was sentenced to death on November 16, 1983. Id. After
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court noted that the first issue was whether the trial court
wrongfully based its dismissal of the defendant's post-verdict
motions on the defendant's escape from prison."'0 The court
noted that the defendant's voluntary abandonment of the pro-
ceedings invited a dismissal.7 1 In deciding that the defendant
could not revive his post-verdict motions, the court explained
that it could not allow the defendant to benefit from his utter
disrespect of the trial court.272
As a result, the supreme court concluded that because the
defendant failed to appear during the appeal process, he had not
preserved any allegations of error.27 Therefore, the remainder
of the court's analysis was restricted to the mandatory appeal of
all death sentence cases as provided for under the Sentencing
Act.27 ' After reviewing the defendant's case under the Sentenc-
ing Act, the court affirmed the sentence of death.275 In the
wake of Kindler, Pennsylvania courts will have grounds for
dismissing post-verdict motions of fugitive defendants.
his escape, he was at large until April 26, 1985, when he was captured in Canada.
Id. On October 23, 1986, the defendant escaped once again from the Canadian au-
thorities and was at large for approximately two years. Id. After being featured on
"America's Most Wanted," the defendant was once again apprehended, and he was
returned to Pennsylvania on September 26, 1991. Id.
270. Id. at 2-3. The general rule in such cases is that fugitive defendants have
no right to appellate review when they are absent during the appellate process. Id.
at 3. (citing Commonwealth v. Passaro, 476 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1984)). However, in the
case at bar, the defendant escaped while his post-verdict motions were pending not
while the present appeal was pending. Kindler, 639 A.2d at 3.
271. Kindler, 639 A.2d at 3.
272. Id. at 3-4. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that the United
States Supreme Court held that the dismissal of a fugitive's appeal was a reason-
able sanction and that a fugitive waived his right to have the court consider his
appeal when he voluntarily fled the jurisdiction. Id. (citing Ortega-Rodriguez v. Unit-
ed States, 113 S. Ct. 1199 (1993) and Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970)).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined that the reasoning set forth in those
cases was persuasive and indicated that Pennsylvania courts could also fashion an
appropriate remedy to deal with fugitives. Kindler, 639 A.2d at 3.
273. Kindler, 639 A.2d at 4.
274. Id.; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (Supp. 1994) (Sentencing Act).
275. Kindler, 639 A.2d at 5-8.
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CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-RELEVANCE-RAPE SHIELD
LAW-PRIOR SEXUAL ASSAULT-Commonwealth v. Johnson, 638
A.2d 940 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed
a trial court's exclusion of evidence of a prior sexual assault
suffered by a rape victim on the basis of relevance, but not on
the basis of the Pennsylvania Rape Shield Law.
In Commonwealth v. Johnson,27 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania determined that evidence that a rape victim had
been the previous victim of a sexual assault was admissible
under the Rape Shield Law. 7 In Johnson, a nineteen year-old
defendant was charged with numerous offenses including rape,
indecent assault, and corrupting the morals of a minor.78 Dur-
ing the course of his trial, the defendant attempted to introduce
evidence that the victim had previously been a victim of a sexual
assault.279 The alleged perpetrator of the prior assault had wit-
nessed the defendant's actions and had so testified.' The de-
fendant attempted to introduce evidence that this witness had
previously assaulted the victim to impeach the credibility of both
the victim and the witness.' \The trial court held that the evi-
dence was inadmissible under the Rape Shield Law, and the
superior court affirmed. 82
Noting that an appellate court could only reverse an eviden-
tiary ruling where an abuse of discretion was clear, the supreme
court stated that the purpose of the Rape Shield Law was to
ensure that a trial for sexual assault did not deteriorate into an
attack upon the victim's reputation for sexual conduct.' The
court indicated that an assault would not affect a victim's repu-
276. 638 A.2d 940 (Pa. 1994).
277. Johnson, 638 A.2d at 941; see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3104 (1983). The
pertinent section of the Rape Shield Law provides:
Evidence of specific instances of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, opin-
ion evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, and reputation evi-
dence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct shall not be admissible in
prosecutions under this chapter except evidence of the alleged victim's past
sexual conduct with the defendant where consent of the alleged victim is at
issue and such evidence is otherwise admissible pursuant to the rules of evi-
dence.
1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3104(a).
278. Johnson, 638 A.2d at 942.
279. Id. at 941-42. The prior incident was approximately three or four years
before the events at issue. Id.
280. Id, at 941.
281. Id. at 942. The defendant contended that the victim was shifting blame for
the previous assault. Id.
282. Johnson, 638 A.2d at 942.
283. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Foy, 612 A.2d 1349 (Pa. 1992)).
1995
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 33:523
tation because becoming a victim was not voluntary conduct.'
The court asserted that the Rape Shield Law was not intended
to exclude this type of evidence.s Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the Rape Shield Law did not prohibit the admission
of evidence showing that a victim had previously been the victim
of a prior nonconsensual sexual assault.'
Continuing its analysis, the court determined that the prof-
fered evidence was immaterial to the questions at issue in the
case." 7 Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's decision ex-
cluding the evidence.' While it is unclear how a prior sexual
assault would be relevant, the decision in Johnson makes clear
that the Rape Shield Law will not be the grounds for the exclu-
sion of evidence that an alleged victim has previously been the
victim of a prior sexual assault.
CRIMINAL LAW-UNLAWFUL ARREST-SUPPRESSION OF EvI-
DENCE-UNDERAGE CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL-Commonwealth
v. Bullers, 637 A.2d 1326 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that evidence obtained from a warrantless ar-
rest of a minor is inadmissible when the minor was arrested
solely for underage consumption of alcohol.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently disposed of an
appeal which has broad implications for the authority of a police
officer to arrest an individual for underage drinking without a
warrant. In Commonwealth v. Bullers,"9 the defendant was
hitchhiking when he was stopped by a police officer who was
investigating a report of a stolen car.' After smelling the odor
of beer on the defendant's breath, the police officer arrested him
for underage drinking. 1 Subsequently, the officer searched




288. Id. at 943.
289. 637 A.2d 1326 (Pa. 1994).
290. Bullers, 637 A.2d at 1327,
291. Id. The defendant was charged under section 6308 of the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Offense defined - A person commits a summary offense if he, being less
than 21 years of age, attempts to purchase, purchases, consuiies, possesses or
knowingly and intentionally transports any liquor or malt....
(d) Notification - The police department making an arrest for a suspected
violation of subsection (a) shall so notify the parents or guardian of the minor
charged.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6308 (1994).
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.the defendant and discovered evidence of numerous other
crimes. 2 Upon the basis of this evidence, the trial court con-
victed the defendant of several crimes."5 On appeal, the supe-
rior court determined that the defendant's arrest was unlawful,
and the evidence discovered by the police officer was inadmissi-
ble.' Therefore, the superior court reversed the decision of the
trial court.295
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that criminal pro-
ceedings in summary offense cases were typically initiated by
issuing or giving the defendant a citation or by filing a com-
plaint against the defendant.' The court indicated that in sit-
uations specifically provided for by statute, the proceedings
could be commenced by arresting the defendant without a war-
rant. 7 After examining the underage drinking statute, the
court concluded that the statute did not provide the police with
the authority to arrest an underage drinker in the absence of a
warrant."9 Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the
superior court suppressing the evidence obtained incident to the
unlawful arrest of the defendant.' The holding in Bullers
plainly prohibits warrantless arrests of individuals for underage
consumption of alcohol.
292. Bullers, 637 A.2d at 1327. The police officer's search of the defendant re-
vealed a loaded firearm taken from a stolen vehicle, as well as various personal
items which were later determined to have been stolen from various other automo-
biles. Id.
293. Id. The defendant was convicted of the theft of a firearm, carrying a fire-
arm without a license, unauthorized use of an automobile, receiving stolen property,
and three other counts of theft and receiving stolen property. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1328.
297. Bullers, 637 A.2d at 1328. The prosecution contended that the phrase
"making an arrest" present in section 6308(d) was statutory authorization allowing
the police to arrest an individual for underage drinking. Id.
298. Id. at 1330-31. The court also determined whether the Borough Code pro-
vided the authority to arrest the defendant in the absence of a warrant. Id. at 1329
(citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46121 (1966)). The court held that, in the absence
of any disorderly conduct or breach of the peace, the Borough Code did not autho-
rize a warrantless arrest of the defendant. Bullers, 637 A.2d at 1329.




wealth v. Gaynor, 648 A.2d 295 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that actors firing weapons at each other
may not be considered accomplices, but that the defendant's in-
tent to kill the intended victim can be attributed to the defen-
dant when the intended victim kills a bystander.
In Commonwealth v. Gaynor,"o the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court considered whether the defendant could be charged with
first degree murder when a bystander was killed by the
defendant's intended victim.3'0 The court found that the
defendant's intent to kill the intended victim could be attributed
to the defendant when an innocent bystander was shot and
killed by the intended victim."2
In Gaynor, the defendant and another man were arguing
outside a video arcade store which was frequented by chil-
dren."3 The armed parties moved the argument inside the ar-
cade and subsequently both parties began firing their weapons
at each other.' The defendant fired once at the intended vic-
tim and fled the arcade."5 The intended victim fired back at
the defendant." Neither man was hurt; however, during the
gunfire, one child was killed and two others were injured.0 7 At
trial, it was determined that the intended victim's gun was the
weapon responsible for the death and injuries of the chil-
dren.'r
The defendant was charged with, inter alia, first degree mur-
der."re The trial court convicted the defendant on the murder
charge concluding that the defendant, by engaging in "mutual
combat" with the intended victim, possessed the requisite intent
and malice necessary to bring about the death of the innocent
bystander.' The superior court reversed the murder sentence
holding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the
300. 648 A.2d 295 (Pa. 1994).
301. Gaynor, 648 A.2d at 297. The court noted that the trial court had referred
to the combat as a "duel.* Id. at 298 n.5. The court asserted that this characteriza-
tion was troubling because a duel 'was usually carried out by pre-arrangement and
in conformity with agreed or prescribed rules." Id.
302. Id. at 297.
303. Id. at 296.
304. Id.
305. Id.




310. Id. at 297.
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defendant specifically intended to kill the bystander."'
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the superior court's
decision and reinstated the sentence.312 The court determined
that the defendant intended to kill the intended victim. 13
Moreover, the court construed the Pennsylvania Crimes Code to
impose liability on a party that intends to harm one party that
results in injury to a third party.814 The court concluded that
the death of the bystander, killed by the intended victim's gun,
could be attributed to the defendant because of the defendant's
specific intent to kill the intended victim. 1
Attributing transferred intent to the actions of combatants
broadens the scope of liability. The Commonwealth will be not
be required to establish accomplice or co-conspirator liability to
charge both parties with murder where their intent to kill each
other results in the death of innocent bystanders.
CRIMINAL LAW-FIRST-DEGREE MURDER-ACCOMPLICE-BURDEN
OF PROOF-Commonwealth v. Huffinan, 638 A.2d 961 (Pa.
1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that in order to
convict an accomplice of first degree murder committed by a
principal, the prosecution must prove that the accomplice in-
tended to kill, based on evidence other than the state of mind of
the principal.
In Commonwealth v. Huffmnan,16 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court substantially clarified the standard necessary to convict
an accomplice of first-degree murder." ' The defendants con-
spired to commit a burglary during which an individual was
beaten to death. 18 The evidence concerning the murder was of
limited significance due to the fact that the defendants accused
each other in their pre-trial statements, and both refused to
testify at trial."' The defendants were both convicted of first
311. Gaynor, 648 A.2d at 297.
312. Id. at 299.
313. Id. at 298. The court noted that there was no evidence to establish that
the combatants were accomplices or co-conspirators, and therefore shared intent
could not be established. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 299.
.316. 638 A.2d 961 (Pa. 1994).
317. Huffman, 638 A.2d at 961.
318. Id. The defendant's accomplice, Eric Grier, was tried jointly with the de-
fendant. Id. at 961 n.5. The supreme court disposed of Griers by reference to its
decision in this case. See Commonwealth v. Grier, 638 A.2d 965, 965 (Pa. 1994).
319. Huffman, 638 A.2d at 962.
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degree murder and were sentenced to death.20
On appeal, the defendants claimed that the trial judge's in-
struction to the jury concerning accomplice liability was incor-
rect because it permitted the jurors to find an accomplice guilty
of first-degree murder without finding specific intent to kill.321
The supreme court noted that the trial judge's failure to correct-
ly explain the law deprived the defendants of a fair trial.'
The supreme court indicated that in order to convict an accom-
plice of first-degree murder the Commonwealth had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accomplice had the specific
intent to kill.2 ' Further, the court held that proof of the
accomplice's state of mind could not be based upon the state of
mind of the principal. 2 Therefore, the court concluded that
the trial judge's instruction had improperly permitted the jury to
convict the defendants of first degree murder without proof of a
specific intent to kill.23
Because an improper jury charge concerning a fundamental
question of law was not a harmless error, the supreme court
reversed the defendants' murder convictions and remanded the
cases for new trials.2 " After Huffman, the Commonwealth will
be required to prove a specific intent to kill in order for an ac-
complice to be convicted of first degree murder.
320. Id. at 961.
321. Id. at 962. The defendant raised other issues on appeal, which were not
addressed by the court because it reversed on the basis of the improper instruction.
Id. at 962 n.7.
322. Id. at 962 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bishop, 372 A.2d 794, 796 (Pa.
1977)).
323. Huffman, 638 A.2d at 962.
324. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Bachert, 453 A.2d 931, 935 (Pa. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1043 (1983)).
325. Huffman, 638 A.2d at 963.
326. Id. at 964 (citing Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155 (Pa. 1978)).
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CRIMINAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE-VIDEOTAPE DEPOSITIONS AND TESTIMONY-CHILD VICTIMS
AND WITNESSES ACT-RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESS-
ES-Commonwealth v. Louden, 638 A.2d 953 (Pa. 1994)-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the use of videotaped
depositions and testimony violates the defendant's right to con-
frontation of witnesses under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE CONTROL ACT-EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a defendant has no ex-
pectation of privacy in a conversation that is audible in an ad-
joining building and therefore a tape recording of that conversa-
tion is admissible.
In Commonwealth v. Louden, " the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania held that provisions of the Child Victims and Witnesses
Act,32 which provide for videotaped depositions and testimony
by closed-circuit television violated Article I, Section 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution and were therefore unconstitution-
al. 2' In Louden, the defendants, a husband and wife, ran a
day care center out of their home.' 0 A neighbor became con-
cerned when, in her adjoining home, she overheard the defen-
dants arguing followed by sounds of hitting and children cry-
ing."' The neighbor recorded the noises and informed the po-
lice of her fears that children were being mistreated. 2 Based
on both the neighbor's and the police officers' observations, the
defendants were arrested and charged with endangering the
welfare of children.'
At trial, the defendants successfully moved to suppress the
recordings, and the Commonwealth permitted three children to
testify through the use of videotape depositions.' At the close
of the proceedings, the defendants were convicted, and they filed
a motion in arrest of judgment and for a new trial.' The trial
court granted the defendants' motion for a new trial on the
grounds that the use of the videotape depositions had violated
327. 638 A.2d 953 (Pa. 1994).
328. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5984-85 (Supp. 1994).
329. Louden, 638 A.2d at 953.
330. Id. at 954
331. Id. at 953.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Louden, 638 A.2d at 954.
335. Id. at 955.
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the defendants' constitutional right to confront witnesses against
them.3"
In reviewing the constitutionality of the challenged statutory
provisions, the supreme court asserted that the Pennsylvania
Constitution required that a criminal defendant have the right
to confront witnesses against him face-to-face. 37 The court not-
ed that this provision was written in plain language and its
meaning was unmistakable. 38 Further, the court reasoned that
the subjective fears of a witness were not sufficient to warrant
the restriction of the defendants' right to confront witnesses
against them.3" As a result, the court found that the sections
5984 and 5985 violated a defendant's right to confrontation, and
therefore, both sections were unconstitutional.' "
As a result of the court's decision to grant the defendants a
new trial, the court also disposed of the issue concerning the
admissibility of the neighbor's tape recordings.3" The Wiretap-
ping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act 2 provided that
the defendants could suppress any evidence of a communication
which was unlawfully intercepted.3u The statute only protects
conversations between individuals who expect that their com-
munication would not be intercepted and under circumstances
which justified this expectation.3 The supreme court held that
because the defendants argued loud enough for their neighbors
to overhear their conversation, the defendants could not claim
any expectation of privacy.3" Therefore, the supreme court
concluded that the trial court erred in granting the defendants'
motion to suppress the tape recordings.'
336. Id. The case was appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
because the trial court had found a statute unconstitutional. Id. (citing 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 722(6)).
337. Louden, 638 A.2d at 957. Article 1, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion provides, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right . . to meet
the witnesses face to face . . . ." PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
338. Louden, 638 A.2d at 957 (quoting Commonwealth v. Russo, 131 A.2d 83,
88 (Pa. 1957)).
339. Louden, 638 A.2d at 957.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5701-26 (1983 & Supp. 1994).
343. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5721 (Supp. 1994). Section 5721 provides, '[any
aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or other adversary proceeding in or before
any court . . . may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire, electronic
or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on any of the following
grounds: (1) [t]he communication was unlawfully intercepted .... " Id.
344. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5702.
345. Louden, 638 A.2d at 959.
346. Id.
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In Louden, the court reaffirmed that the Commonwealth can-
not use videotape depositions in criminal proceedings, because
those depositions violate the confrontation clause of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution. 7
CRIMINAL LAW-WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEI-
ZURES-EVIDENCE-POLICE RADIO TRANSMISSIONS-SPECIFIC
AND ARTICULABLE FACTS-Commonwealth v. Queen, 639 A.2d
443 (Pa. 1994)-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
in order for a police officer to stop an individual on the basis of a
radio transmission, the police officer must have a reasonable
suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts that estab-
lish the individual's involvement in a crime.
In Commonwealth v. Queen," the defendant was pulled
over by three detectives; another police officer was called in for
backup., 9 One of the detectives informed the officer that the
defendant appeared to be a suspect wanted in connection with a
robbery.' When the officer asked the defendant to step out of
his vehicle, he noticed a suspicious bulge under the defendant's
shirt. 51 The officer's search revealed a concealed weapon, and
the defendant was arrested and charged with carrying a firearm
without a license and carrying a firearm on a public street."
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, asserting that
the search was unconstitutional."3 The lower court denied the
suppression motion, and the defendant appealed."' On appeal
to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the defendant claimed
that the evidence presented at the suppression hearing was not
sufficient to justify the search and seizure which lead to his ar-
347. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously held that videotape depo-
sitions in criminal proceedings violated the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Common-
wealth v. Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281, 284 (Pa. 1991). Because the decision in Ludwig
was prior to the use of videotape testimony pursuant to the Child Victims and Wit-
nesses Act, the court in Ludwig did not address the constitutionality of that statute.
Justice Flaherty pointed out in dissent in Louden that Section 5985(a), per-
taining to live closed-circuit testimony, was not involved in the case at bar, and
therefore, the majority's holding was strictly dictum. Louden, 638 A.2d at 959
(Flaherty, J., dissenting).
For a further discussion of Louden, see Michael L. Bell, Recent Decision, 33
DuQ. L. REv. 361 (1994).
348. 639 A.2d 443 (Pa. 1994).





354. Queen, 639 A.2d at 444.
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rest. 5 The detective, who believed the defendant was a rob-
bery suspect, did not testify at the hearing, and therefore, the
Commonwealth had not presented any evidence as to the basis
of the detective's suspicions."5 '
The supreme court asserted that any evidence discovered
during a Terry stop"7 based on a wanted poster or a radio bul-
letin was admissible if the police officer who issued the poster or
bulletin had a reasonable suspicion to stop the suspect.' Be-
cause the detective who suspected the defendant of robbery did
not testify at the suppression hearing, there was no basis for
determining whether the detective could have articulated facts
sufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion.' Therefore, the
supreme court concluded that the admission of the evidence
violated both the state and federal constitutions."®  Ac-
cordingly, the court reversed and granted the defendant a new
trial.361
After Queen the Commonwealth will still be required to pres-
ent evidence showing specific articulable facts supporting a
search and seizures based on wanted posters, flyers, or radio
bulletins.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS-Commonwealth v. Hartman, 638 A.2d 968 (Pa.
1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a trial
judge's instruction to the jury on a theory of culpability that the
prosecution had rejected violates the defendant's right to due
process.
In Commonwealth v. Hartman, 2 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania decided the issue of whether a trial judge could in-
struct the jury on a theory of culpability when the prosecution
had expressly rejected that theory prior to trial.' In Hartman,
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. A Terry stop occurs when a police officer pats down a suspicious suspect
in an attempt to determine whether the individual is carrying a concealed weapon.
BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 1420 (6th ed. 1990). The scope of the search is limited by
the circumstances which initially justified the stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30
(1968).
358. Queen, 639 A.2d at 445 (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,
232 (1985)).
359. Queen, 639 A.2d at 445.
360. Id. at 446. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; PA. CONST. art I, § 8.
361. Queen, 639 A.2d at 446.
362. 638 A.2d 968 (Pa. 1994).
363. Hartman, 638 A.2d at 969-70.
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the defendant was charged with rape.'" He alleged the com-
plainant consented to have intercourse.3" Prior to trial, de-
fense counsel prepared to defend against the allegation that the
complainant lacked the mental capacity to consent and request-
ed a psychiatric evaluation of the complainant.' Based upon
the prosecuting attorney's statement that he would not proceed
under a theory of mental incapacity, the court denied the
defendant's request for an examination."
Prior to trial, the trial judge ruled that the complainant's
capacity to consent would not be an issue in the defendant's
trial."' At the close of the trial, the trial judge instructed the
jury concerning the invalidity of the consent given by a mentally
deficient individuali" On appeal to the supreme court, the de-
fendant claimed that he had been denied due process because of
the trial judge's instruction."' The supreme court asserted that
the trial judge's instruction improperly raised an issue which the
defendant was not permitted to address in his defense, because
the court had specifically excluded that issue."' 1 The court held
that this procedure violated the defendant's basic due process
rights to adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard, and the
opportunity to defend himself.72
The court reasoned that the defendant did not have adequate
notice because the trial judge had determined that the issue
would not be addressed.' Further, the court asserted that the
defendant was denied the right to defend himself because he
was unable to have the complainant psychiatrically exam-
ined.374 Finally, the court noted that the defendant was also
denied the opportunity to be heard on the particular issue of the
complainant's mental capacity.7 The supreme court vacated
the defendant's conviction of rape and indecent assault and
364. Id. at 969.
365. Id. There was a question as to the complainant's mental capacity to con-
sent to intercourse. Id.
366. Id. at 970. Section 3121(4) protects a mentally deficient victim who lacks
the capacity to lawfully consent to intercourse. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121(4) (Supp.
1994).
367. Hartman, 638 A.2d at 970.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 969-70.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 971.
372. Hartman, 638 A.2d at 971 (quoting Commonwealth v. Thompson, 281 A.2d
856, 858 (Pa. 1971)).





ordered a new trial. 78
CRIMINAL LAW-AUTOMOBILES-LICENSE SUSPENSION-CHEMI-
CAL TESTING--Commonwealth v. Ingram, 648 A.2d 285 (Pa.
1994-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, prior to
requesting a motorist to submit to chemical testing, a police
officer must explain that refusal will result in license suspension
and that the right to confer with an attorney does not apply.
In Commonwealth v. Ingram,3 " the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court clarified the scope of the warnings that the police had to
give to an individual who refused to submit to a blood alcohol
test.37 The appellee was involved in an automobile accident,
and the responding police officer believed that the appellee was
intoxicated."' Because he failed the field sobriety tests, the ap-
pellee was placed into the police vehicle, and read a warning
regarding chemical testing.' The appellee refused to submit
to chemical testing at the hospital, and the Department of
Transportation suspended his license for one year."s
On appeal of the suspension, the appellee contended that the
warning that he was given confused him. 2 Both the court of
common pleas and the commonwealth court held that the warn-
ing was confusing and reversed the suspension.'
376. Id.
377. 648 A.2d 285 (Pa. 1994).
378. Ingram, 648 A.2d at 286.
379. Id. at 290.
380. Id. The warning provided, in part:
I am now going to request that you submit to a chemical test(s) of your
breath, blood or urine, in any combination, to determine your blood alcohol
and/or drug content.
You have the right to refuse to submit to such a chemical test(s), and if you
refuse, no test(s) will be conducted.
You have the right to know the results of any chemical test(s) conducted.
If you refuse to submit to the chemical test(s) I am now requesting, your
operating privileges will be suspended for a period of twelve (12) months, in
addition to any other penalty imposed, and that fact, that you refused to sub-
mit to the requested chemical test(s) may be introduced as evidence in a court
of law.
Id. at 290-91.
381. Id. at 290. Section 1547 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code provides that
any individual who operates a motor vehicle in the Commonwealth is "deemed to
have given consent" to chemical testing for alcohol and controlled substances. 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1547(a) (1977). Refusal to submit to chemical testing carries an auto-
matic one-year suspension of the operator's license. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1547(b).
382. Ingram, 648 A.2d at 291. He argued that the activity going on around him
and the fact that the warning was given orally prevented him from fully under-
standing the warning. Id.
383. Id. The commonwealth court held that because the officer failed to explain
that chemical testing was a civil proceeding, and that the right to contact an attor-
Vol. 33:523
1995 PA Recent Developments - Criminal Law
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that its
prior decision in Commonwealth v. O'Connell,' and its proge-
ny, had established that a warning had to be given to a motorist
who was asked to submit to chemical testing if the motorist had
previously been given Miranda warnings or if the motorist re-
quested to consult with another, prior to submitting to the
test." The court explained that a warning was necessary in
these situations to make the motorist aware that the constitu-
tional rights that applied to criminal proceedings were not appli-
cable to the potential suspension of the driver's license, which
was a civil proceeding.'
The supreme court held that an adequate warning had to
inform the motorist that refusal to submit to chemical testing
would result in a one-year suspension of his driver's license and
that Miranda rights were not applicable to chemical testing."
The court overruled the line of commonwealth court cases that
had required the police officer to explain the distinction between
civil proceedings and criminal proceedings and why Miranda
rights did not apply to civil proceedings.' Ingram has clarified
the confusion over the type of warning that must be given to
motorists who are asked to submit to chemical testing for the
ney only applied in a criminal proceeding, the warning was insufficient. Id. at 291-
92 (citing Commonwealth v. Sorg, 606 A.2d 1270 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), allocatur denied,
613 A.2d 561 (Pa. 1992)).
384. 555 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1989).
385. Ingram, 648 A.2d at 290. The court explained that these warnings had
been initiated to make clear to those being asked to submit to chemical tests that
the Miranda rights did not apply to chemical tests. Id. at 293. The supreme court
noted that this warning was necessary because the motorist was often arrested, and
the Miranda warnings were given in connection with the arrest. Id. The motorist
then was confused as to why the motorist did not have a right to confer with coun-
sel prior to submitting to a chemical test. Id.
The commonwealth court, however, had interpreted the supreme court's deci-
sions to require that the police officer explain the distinction between criminal and
civil proceedings and that constitutional protections did not apply to civil proceed-
ings. Id. at 294.
386. Id. at 293.
387. Id. at 294-95. The court noted that the subject matter of the warning,
rather than any particular words, had to be conveyed by the police. Id. at 295.
388. Id. at 294. In rejecting the commonwealth court's prior holdings, the su-
preme court noted:
Requiring police officers to explain that the request to submit to chemical
testing is a civil proceeding and not a criminal proceeding, and that the right
to counsel only applies in criminal proceedings, forces them to recite words
connoting legal distinctions which are enigmatic at best. It is incomprehensible
how evoking these arcane differences will assist the apparently intoxicated mo-
torist to make a knowing and conscious decision about whether or not to sub-
mit to chemical testing.
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presence of alcohol and controlled substances. The motorist must
be informed that refusal will result in suspension of his driver's
license and that he does not have the right to confer with an
attorney prior to testing. The warning, however, need not ex-
plain why the Miranda rights are not applicable.
CRIMINAL LAW-DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCO-
HOL-REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO A BLOOD TEST-PASSEN-
GER-Commonwealth v. Hoover, 637 A.2d 721 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994)-The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that a
passenger who gains control of the vehicle is considered a driver
and is therefore subject to suspension of his driver's license for
refusing to submit to a blood alcohol test.
In Commonwealth v. Hoover, 9 the defendant was travelling
in a pickup truck driven by another individual."' As the
defendant's vehicle passed a state trooper's vehicle, the truck
swerved toward the trooper's car and nearly caused an acci-
dent.391 The trooper pulled the truck over and arrested the
driver for driving under the influence of alcohol. 92 At the time,
the defendant stated that he was more intoxicated than his com-
panion, and the trooper feared that it would be unsafe to leave
the defendant at the scene with the truck.393 Therefore, the
trooper requested that the defendant accompany him to the
police station, and the defendant voluntarily agreed."
During the trip to the station, the defendant admitted that he
had grabbed the steering wheel of the vehicle causing it to
swerve toward the trooper's car."9 Upon hearing this admis-
sion, the trooper placed the defendant under arrest for driving
under the influence.' Incident to his arrest, the defendant
lost his driver's license for one year for refusing to submit to a
chemical test to determine his blood alcohol level."9 The defen-
dant appealed on the grounds that the trooper did not have
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had been driv-
ing the pickup truck.398
Relying on the trial court's findings, the commonwealth court
389. 637 A.2d 721 (Pa. 1994).





395. Hoover, 637 A.2d at 722.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 721.
398. Id.
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affirmed the suspension of the defendant's license.'" The trial
court determined that any individual who drove, operated, or
was in actual physical control of the motion of a vehicle was
required to submit to a blood alcohol test.' The common-
wealth court agreed and held that because the truck was in
motion, the defendant took actual physical control of the vehicle
by grabbing the wheel."° ' Therefore, the defendant could be
lawfully arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and
was required to submit to a chemical test to determine his blood
alcohol level. 2
CRIMINAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-CIVIL FORFEITURE OF
PROPERTY-INDIGENT-Commonwealth v. $9,847 U.S. Currency,
637 A.2d 736 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court held that an indigent defendant has a consti-
tutional right to counsel in an action for the civil forfeiture of
property.
In Commonwealth v. $9,847 U.S. Currency,' the Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania held that if the Commonwealth
seeks the forfeiture of an indigent defendant's property pursuant
to title 42, sections 6801 and 6802 of the Pennsylvania Code, the
defendant has the right to court-appointed representation at no
cost.' In $9,847 U.S. Currency, the defendant's home was
searched by police officers pursuant to a search warrant, and the
police seized marijuana, various drug paraphernalia, and
$9,847." 5 The defendant was arrested, pleaded guilty, and was
sentenced to prison.'
The Commonwealth sought the forfeiture of the money found
in the defendant's home as the proceeds of an illegal drug trans-
action. 7 The defendant asked the court to appoint counsel to
399. Id.
400. Hoover, 637 A.2d at 723 (quoting 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1547(a) (1977)).
401. Hoover, 637 A.2d at 723.
402. Id.
403. 637 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1994).
404. $9,847 U.S. Currency, 637 A.2d at 746.
405. Id. at 737.
406.. Id.
407. Id. The Commonwealth sought forfeiture of the money pursuant to sections
6801 (a)(6Xi) (A) and (B), title 42 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes. Id. The
pertinent parts of section 6801 provide:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the Commonwealth and no prop-
erty right shall exist in them:
(A) Money ... furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in ex-
change for a controlled substance in violation of The Controlled Substance,
1995
Duquesne Law Review
represent him, and the trial court denied his request.' The
defendant filed an interlocutory appeal. 9
The court first addressed whether the order was immediately
appealable. The commonwealth court determined that, if the
defendant's right to appointed representation was protected by
the Pennsylvania Constitution or the United States Constitu-
tion, the trial court's order which denied him that right was
immediately appealable."" Therefore, the court had to address
whether the defendant had a right to court-appointed counsel in
a civil forfeiture case.41'
Beginning its analysis with the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, the commonwealth court asserted
that the Due Process Clause could require the appointment of
counsel to an indigent defendant when a substantial interest
was involved.4"2 However, the court noted that a presumption
existed that a defendant was only entitled to an appointed attor-
ney when his physical liberty was at stake."3 Utilizing the test
set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Mathews
v. Eldridge... the commonwealth court held that the facts in
the present case overcame the presumption against appointment
of counsel in a civil forfeiture setting.415 The court determined
that there was a "distinct likelihood of erroneous depriva-
tion."4 ' Further, the court concluded that the property interest
was substantial even though property interests of larger dollar
Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, and all proceeds traceable to such an ex-
change.
(B) Money .. .used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of The
Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6801 (Supp. 1994).
408. $9,847 U.S. Currency, 637 A.2d at 737.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 741. The court asserted that its determination did involve "boot-
strapping." Id. However, the court explained that its determination was necessary
due to the fact that the existence of a right in the defendant and the need to allow
an interlocutory appeal to defend that right were hopelessly intertwined. Id. at 741
n.12.
411. Id. at 741-42.
412. Id.
413. $9,847 U.S. Currency, 637 A.2d at 741-42 (citing Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981)).
414. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Eldridge, the Court held that three factors must
be evaluated to determine whether the Due Process Clause requires additional proce-
dural safeguards. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. The three factors are as follows: 1) the
private interest which will be affected by the government's actions; 2) the risk that
there will be an erroneous deprivation of the private interest and the probable value
of an additional safeguard; and 3) the government's interests including the additional
burden which will be imposed by the safeguard. Id.
415. $9,847 U.S. Currency, 637 A.2d at 746.
416. Id. at 744.
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amounts were held to be insubstantial.417 Finally, the court
noted that because public defenders represented indigent clients
in criminal cases, representation in civil forfeiture cases did not
constitute a substantial additional burden on the govern-
ment.418 Therefore, the court concluded that the defendant was
constitutionally required to have appointed counsel. '19
In the future, the Commonwealth will likely be required to
fund court-appointed counsel for all cases involving a substantial
forfeiture of an indigent defendant's property.
CRIMINAL LAW-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-IMPROPER SEARCH AND
SEIZURE-ABANDONMENT OF PROPERTY-EVIDENCE-SUPPRES-
SION OF EVIDENCE-Commonwealth v. Johnson, 636 A.2d 656
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Superior Court held
that the police do not need a warrant to seize abandoned proper-
ty. The court further held that subjective intent is not control-
ling in determining abandonment.
In Commonwealth v. Johnson,2 ' the police placed the defen-
dant under surveillance after receiving an anonymous phone call
that identified the defendant as a drug dealer."' The police ob-
served the defendant loitering in a park, and then observed the
defendant being approached by another individual.422 After the
two men spoke briefly, the defendant walked to a nearby tree
and retrieved a paper bag.423 The other man looked into the
bag."' The defendant then placed the bag back in the tree, and
his companion left the park.425
The police officers then approached the defendant and re-
trieved the bag from up in the tree.'26 After finding fifty vials
of crack cocaine in the paper bag, the officers searched the de-
fendant and placed him under arrest.' 7 The defendant was
subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance
417. Id. at 745 (citing United States v. 1604 Oceola, 803 F. Supp. 1194 (N.D.
Tex. 1992)).
418. $9,847 U.S. Currency, 637 A.2d at 745 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §
9960.6(a)(11) (Supp. 1994) (the Public Defenders Act)).
419. $9,847 U.S. Currency, 637 A.2d at 746. In addition, the court held that if
the defendant recovered some of the money in question he would no longer be indi-
gent, and the trial court could require him to reimburse the Commonwealth. Id.
420. 636 A.2d 656 (Pa. 1994).









and possession with intent to deliver."8 The defendant filed a
motion to suppress the evidence, and the trial court granted the
motion. 29 On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania be-
gan its analysis by noting that the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution requires police officers to obtain a
search warrant prior to a search." ° The court asserted howev-
er, that the police were not required to obtain a warrant to
search property that had been abandoned by its owner.'31 The
trial court determined that the defendant had not intended to
abandon the bag, and therefore there was an expectation of
privacy.' 2 The court therefore suppressed the evidence because
it was obtained without a search warrant."
On appeal, the superior court noted that the defendant's sub-
jective intent was not controlling.' The court held that aban-
donment occurred when the "surrender of possession of the prop-
erty constitutes such a relinquishment of interest in the proper-
ty that a reasonable expectation of privacy may no longer be as-
serted."45 The superior court determined that the defendant's
action of placing his bag in a tree in a public park diminished
his expectation of privacy." Further, the court reasoned that
the defendant's behavior evidenced an intent to abandon the bag
in the event that the police became aware of his activities."7
As a result, the superior court concluded that the defendant
abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in his sack of
crack vials. 8 Therefore, the superior court concluded that the
police were not required to obtain a warrant before seizing the




430. Id. at 658 (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 551 A.2d 313, 315 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rispo, 487 A.2d 937, 939 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985))).
431. Johnson, 636 A.2d at 658 (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 551 A.2d
313, 315 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)).




436. Id. at 659.
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CRIMINAL LAW-SENTENCING--Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 636
A.2d 1166 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that although a defendant can be convicted of vio-
lating multiple subsections of the criminal assault statute, the
defendant can only be sentenced for one violation.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently clarified the
proper method of sentencing pursuant to the simple assault
statute. In Commonwealth v. Rhoads,'5 the defendant was
charged under two separate subsections of the simple assault
statue."1 The jury convicted the defendant on both counts of
simple assault, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to
two consecutive prison terms of one to two years under two
different subsections of the assault statute.'
On appeal, the defendant claimed that his sentence was ille-
gal because the two subsections of the simple assault statute
only provided for alternative pleading.' Thus, the statute
could not provide the basis for separate prison terms for a single
criminal act." The superior court found that the statute was
phrased in the disjunctive, and further, each subsection provided
only an alternative basis of liability."5 While the defendant's
conduct subjected him to criminal liability under both subsec-
tions of the statute, the court held that this did not provide for
separate sentences under each subsection."'
The court asserted that for the defendant to be legally sen-
tenced to more than one jail term, the defendant's actions must
result in more than one violation of the laws of the Common-
wealth."7 Therefore, the defendant could only be sentenced to
one jail term, even though the jury convicted him under both
440. 636 A.2d 1166 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
441. Rhoads, 636 A.2d at 1166. The pertinent portion of the simple assault
statute provides:
(a) Offense defined - A person is guilty of assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily in-
jury to another;
(2) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon ....
18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2701 (a)(1), (2) (1983). The defendant shot an individual in
the chest with a gun that the defendant believed was not loaded. Rhoads, 636 A.2d
at 1168.
442. Rhoads, 636 A.2d at 1166-67.
443. id. at 1167.
444. id.
445. Id. at 1167-68.
446. Id.
447. Rhoads, 636 A.2d at 1168 (quoting Commonwealth v. Whetstine, 496 A.2d
777 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)).
1995
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subsections. ' Consequently, this case mandated that the
Commonwealth may only sentence a defendant to one prison
term, regardless of how many subsections of the simple assault
statute impose liability upon the defendant for a single criminal
act.
CRIMINAL LAW-CHILD LURING STATUTE-CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw-OvERBREADTH-VAGuENESS-Commonwealth v. Adamo,
637 A.2d 302 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that the Child Luring Statute is not unconstitutional-
ly vague or overbroad.
In Commonwealth v. Adamo," s the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania held that the Pennsylvania Child Luring Statute'o
withstood a constitutional challenge both on the grounds of
vagueness and overbreadth. 1 In Adamo, the defendant ap-
proached a sixteen year-old boy in a mall and asked the boy if
he would like to earn one thousand dollars for a half hour's
work. 2 The defendant told the boy that he would find out the
nature of the work when he accompanied the defendant to his
car, and the defendant asked the boy not to tell anyone because
the defendant could get into trouble.' The boy told his mother
about the conversation, and the mother telephoned the po-
lice.' The defendant was arrested for attempting to lure a
child into a motor vehicle, and the trial court found the defen-
dant guilty. 5 The defendant appealed his conviction and
raised constitutional objections to the statute. 6
Noting the strong presumption in favor of a statute's constitu-
tionality,"? the superior court examined the defendant's claim
that the Child Luring Statute was void for vagueness."' The
defendant claimed that the statute failed to give adequate notice
of the type of conduct that was forbidden.459
448. Rhoads, 636 A.2d at 1169.
449. 637 A.2d 302 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
450. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2910 (Supp. 1994). This statute provide that "[a]
person who lures a child into a motor vehicle without the consent, express or im-
plied, of the child's parent or guardian, unless the circumstances reasonably indicate
that the child is in need of assistance, commits a misdemeanor of the first degree."
Id.




455. Id. at 304.
456. Adamo, 637 A.2d at 304.
457. See Commonwealth v. Blystone, 549 A.2d 81, 87 (Pa. 1988).
458. Adamo, 637 A.2d at 305.
459. Id. at 305-06. The defendant also argued that the statute was vague be-
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The court asserted that the defendant's own conduct demon-
strated that the statute provided an ascertainable standard.' °
The court ruled that because the defendant indicated to the boy
that he was aware that his conduct could get him in trouble, he
had adequate notice."1 As a result, the court held that the
statute was not vague. 2
The defendant's final contention was that the statute was
overbroad, and therefore, chilled protected expression. 4 3 The
court disagreed with this assertion and held that the defendant
failed to provide any example in which the statute would affect
speech protected under the First Amendment. 6" The
defendant's conviction was therefore affirmed.'
CRIMINAL LAW-SENTENCING-SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT-
MANDATORY SENTENCING FOR SUBSEQUENT ARRESTS-Common-
wealth v. Rivera, 637 A.2d 997 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)-The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court held that the sentence enhancement
provisions apply to the second sentencing without regard to the
order of arrest or conviction for the offenses.
In Commonwealth v. Rivera,"" the Pennsylvania Superior
Court clarified the application of the sentence enhancement
provisions of the drug trafficking sentencing and penalties sec-
tion of the Crimes Code. 7 In Rivera, the defendant was ar-
rested and charged with the possession of cocaine with the in-
tent to deliver in August 1990, and the defendant was charged
cause it failed to define "child" and "lure." Id.
460. Id. at 306.
461. Id.
462. Id. The court also dismissed the defendant's claims concerning the term
"child" by pointing out that this term is defined under kidnapping in the Crimes
Code as anyone under the age of eighteen. Id. at 305. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §
2908(b) (Supp. 1994). Similarly dismissing the defendant's claim with respect to the
term "lure," the court simply utilized the Webster's Dictionary's definition and cited
the fact that the defendant offered his victim one thousand dollars. Adamo, 637 A.2d
at 307.
The defendant also claimed that the statute violated his First Amendment
rights; however, he failed to elaborate factually or provide any legal authority for his
position. Id. at 306. As a result, the court rejected the defendant's claim. Id.
463. Adamo, 637 A.2d at 307.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 308.
466. 637 A.2d 997 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
467. See Rivera, 637 A.2d at 997. The defendant also claimed that there was
insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction, however the court found no merit in
this argument. Id. at 998. The superior court sat en banc to resolve the defendant's




again with possession with intent to deliver and criminal con-
spiracy in May, 1991.' These charges formed the basis of the
defendant's conviction."' On July 29, 1991, the defendant
pleaded guilty to the charge stemming from his August 1990 ar-
rest.47 He was subsequently convicted and sentenced on the
charges arising from his arrest in May of 1991.471 At sentenc-
ing, the trial court imposed a mandatory seven-year prison term
on the defendant for a subsequent drug violation.72
The defendant appealed his sentence, claiming that the sen-
tence enhancement provision only applied if an individual was
arrested and convicted of a first offense prior to the second ar-
rest.47 The superior court noted that the plain language of on-
ly the statutory provision in question was to be reviewed when
interpreting any statutory provision.474 The court asserted that
the provisions of the sentence enhancement subsection were
clear and straightforward.'78 The sentence enhancement provi-
sion applied if the defendant had been convicted of another drug
violation.4 6 In this case, the defendant pleaded guilty on July
29, 1991, to the first offense and on'February of 1992 was sen-
tenced for his second offense.477 Therefore, the sentence en-
hancement provision clearly applied to the defendant.47 As a
result, any defendant who is subject to criminal liability under
the 1990 amendments to title 18, section 7508 of the Pennsylva-
nia Crimes Code will be sentenced to an enhanced prison term if
he has been convicted of an offense on the day he is sentenced
for the second offense.




472. Id. at 997. The mandatory sentencing provision of section 7508 provides:
For purposes of this section, it shall be deemed that a defendant has been
convicted of another drug trafficking offense when the defendant has been
convicted of another offense under section 13(a), (14), (30) or (37) of the Con-
trolled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, or of a similar offense un-
der any statute of any state or the United States, whether or not the
judgment of sentence has been imposed concerning that offense.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7508(a)(1) (Supp. 1994).
473. Rivera, 637 A.2d at 1000.
474. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Gonzales, 609 A.2d 1368, 1373 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992)).
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CRIMINAL LAW-WIRETAPPING STATUTES-PROSTITUTION-
AIDS-DANGER TO LIFE AND LIMB--Commonwealth v. Birdseye,
637 A.2d 1036 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Superi-
or Court held that the issuance of a warrant to obtain evidence
of prostitution was proper because the AIDS epidemic has ren-
dered prostitution a crime dangerous to life and limb.
In Commonwealth v. Birdseye,79 the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed a lower court's decision, taking judicial
notice of the AIDS epidemic, and holding that prostitution was a
crime which was dangerous to life or limb within the provisions
of the United States' and the Pennsylvania wiretapping stat-
utes."8 In Birdseye," the defendants, a father and son, oper-
ated a chain of adult bookstores which they utilized to sell por-
nography and promote prostitution.' The defendants were ar-
rested and found guilty of numerous crimes.'
On appeal, the defendants charged that the trial court erred
in its determination that a superior court justice had lawfully
granted the police search warrants which provided for a wire-
tap.' Both the federal and state wiretapping statutes autho-
rized the police to use wiretaps if the wiretaps could reveal evi-
dence of a crime that was dangerous to life or limb.' The de-
fendants claimed that prostitution was not dangerous to life or
limb.48
7
The superior court held that in light of the spread of the fatal
AIDS virus it could not find that the trial court had erred in
taking judicial notice of the disease.' Further, the court as-
serted that the trial court correctly determined that prostitution
was a crime dangerous to life or limb.' 9 The superior court
was careful to distinguish the defendants' case on the grounds
that the defendants' entire criminal enterprise involved signifi-
479. 637 A.2d 1036 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
480. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1988).
481. Birdseye, 637 A.2d at 1040. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5701-26 (1983 &
Supp. 1994).
482. Birdseye, 637 A.2d at 1036.
483. Id. at 1038.
484. Id. The defendants were convicted of "corrupt organizations, promoting
prostitution, selling obscene materials (two counts) interception of wire communica-
tions, and, possession of intercepting devices." Id. (citations omitted).
485. Id. at 1040.
486. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5708(2).





cantly more criminal activity than one isolated act of prostitu-
tion.4"
CRIMINAL LAW-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-EVIDENCE-SEARCH AND
SEIZURE-WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF ABANDONED HOUSE-Com-
monwealth v. Gordon, 640 A.2d 422 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)-The
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a defendant who lives in
an abandoned house has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
that dwelling, and therefore any evidence obtained from the
dwelling must be gathered pursuant to a valid search warrant.
In Commonwealth v. Gordon,49 ' the superior court held that
a homeless person who was living in an abandoned house had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in that house.4  In Gordon, a
woman reported that her purse was stolen, and the police re-
sponded to the call.4"3 Attempting to track down the suspect,
the officer spoke with an individual who directed the officer to
an abandoned house where a man fitting the description of the
suspect lived.4  The officer entered the abandoned home
through an open door, and approached a room that was sepa-
rated from the rest of the house by a sheet that hung over the
doorway.495 Behind the sheet, the officer found the defendant
watching television with the stolen purse in his possession. 4"
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered by
the police officer, and the trial court denied the motion.497 The
defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property, and he
appealed.498 On appeal to the superior court, the defendant
claimed that the trial court had erred in its determination that
he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the house in
which he was living, and therefore, that the officer's search was
unlawful because the officer had not obtained a search war-
rant.4"
In examining the defendant's claim, the superior court assert-
ed that an essential consideration was whether the defendant
dwelled in the abandoned house."' Further, the court noted
490. Id. at 1041.
491. 640 A.2d 422 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
492. Gordon, 640 A.2d at 426.




497. Gordon, 640 A.2d at 424.
498. ld.
499. Id. at 422-23.
500. Id. at 426.
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that property rights were not determinative of the issue concern-
ing the defendant's expectation of privacy."' In Gordon, the
defendant had resided in the abandoned home for approximately
two to three months, and his room was separated from the re-
mainder of the house by a sheet.'0 2 The court held that these
facts were sufficient to allow the defendant to entertain a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy in his room.5' 3
The court then addressed whether this expectation of privacy
could be considered reasonable by society.' Noting the lack of
modern facilities in the home and the presence of others, the
court held that the defendant had resided in the house regard-
less of its lack of facilities, and the defendant's room was set
apart from the rest of the house. 5 As a result, the court con-
cluded that the warrantless search of the defendant's home
violated the Pennsylvania Constitution."6 Therefore, the trial
court had erred in denying the defendant's motion to sup-
press. 7 Based on this decision, it appears that in the future
the police will be forced to obtain a warrant for the search of an
abandoned building in any situation where they believe that an
individual has been permanently residing therein, and his living
area is separated from other inhabitants or strangers also living
in the structure.
CRIMINAL LAW-SENTENCING-MERGER-Commonwealth v.
Meekins, 644 A.2d 765 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)-The Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon does not merge with possession of instrument of a crime
at sentencing.
In Commonwealth v. Meekins, °8 the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania addressed the issue of whether a conviction for aggra-
vated assault with a deadly weapon should merge for sentencing
purposes with a conviction for the possession of an instrument of
a crime. 9 In Meekins, the defendant was convicted of aggra-
vated assault with a deadly weapon and possession of an instru-
501. Id.





507. Gordon, 640 A.2d at 426.
508. 644 A.2d 765 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
509. Meekins, 644 A.2d at 765.
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ment of crime after he stabbed the victim with a knife.510 The
defendant was sentenced separately for each conviction.51' The
defendant argued that the lower court should have merged the
sentences for the above crimes.12
The superior court began its analysis by noting that the gen-
eral rule was that the lesser included offenses merged into the
greater offenses at sentencing."' The court asserted, however
that merger only applied where the greater offense was depen-
dent on the lesser included offense.51 Next the court examined
the elements of each of crimes for which the defendant was
convicted. 5" The court noted that aggravated assault required
proof of intent to cause injury with a deadly weapon."' 6 Posses-
sion of an instrument of a crime required possession of anything
regularly used or specially made for criminal purposes.1 7
The court asserted that the commission of aggravated assault
was not completely dependent upon the possession of an instru-
ment of crime.518 By distinguishing a deadly weapon from an
instrument of crime, the court held that it was possible to com-
mit the greater offense without committing the lesser of-
fense."19 Therefore, the court concluded that the two crimes
could not be merged for sentencing purposes and the separate
sentences were affirmed.52 Meekins established that unless the
commission of the greater offense is entirely dependent on the





513. Meekin., 644 A.2d at 765-66 (citing Commonwealth v. Leon Williams, 559
A.2d 25 (Pa. 1989)).
514. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Fuller, 579 A.2d 879, 884 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990)).
515. Meekins, 644 A.2d at 766.
516. Meekins, 644 A.2d at 766 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702).
517. Meekin8, 644 A.2d at 766 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 907).
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V. Domestic Relations
A. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-EQUITABLE DIsTRmIBUTIoN-Oaks v. Coo-
per, 638 A.2d 208 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that the assets of a corporation, which the husband
treated as his own, were not marital property because the hus-
band did not own the assets. Further, the supreme court held
that non-marital funds transferred into a marital account post-
separation could not be considered marital assets.
The questions before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Oaks v. Cooper521 involved the distribution and classification of
certain property as marital assets.522 In Oaks, the first issue to
be resolved was whether the husband had a sufficient beneficial
interest in the assets of a farming corporation to characterize
the assets as marital property for the purpose of distribu-
tion."
Despite the husband's disavowal of any interest in the farm,
the superior court held that the husband had received its bene-
fits. 24 The superior court then asserted that despite the
husband's lack of ostensible ownership, the court could deter-
mine that the husband's interest was marital property and
therefore was subject to equitable distribution.525 The court re-
lied on the decision in Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick,52 which held
that a receipt of benefits was sufficient to classify the property
as marital property. 27
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the superior court and
concluded that the farming corporation and its holdings were not
521. 638 A.2d 208 (Pa. 1994).
522. Oaks, 638 A.2d at 210.
523. Id. Consenvoye Farm, Inc. was founded in 1975 as a holding company for
realty which was transferred to the corporation in 1977 by the parents of the hus-
band. Id. The parents received shares of stock in exchange for the transfer. Id.
These shares were then transferred to the husband's sister. Id.
524. Id. at 211. The superior court found that the benefits received by the hus-
band through the corporation included: tax breaks, an intermingling of the farm's
income with his own and the ability to depreciate the farm's equipment on his per-
sonal income tax returns. Id.
525. Id.
526. 547 A.2d 362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). The court in Fitzpatrick held that
"bare title may not be used as a shield to protect for the benefit of one party that
which in reality belongs to the marriage." Fitzpatrick, 547 A.2d at 367.
527. Oaks, 638 A.2d at 211 (citing Fitzpatrick, 547 A.2d at 367).
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marital assets because the husband did not have title.'28 The
court reasoned that any other interest he may have possessed
was merely an expectancy.52 The supreme court asserted that
the superior court's finding of beneficial ownership was in error
because it improperly based its decision on factors relating to
the farming operation rather than the business and holdings of
the corporation.' ° The supreme court explained that the farm-
ing operation and the corporation were separate ventures."'
Therefore, the supreme court held that the mere fact that the
husband had run the farming operation did not make him the
beneficial owner of the corporation because he paid fair rent for
the use of the corporation's assets. 2
The second issue addressed by the supreme court was wheth-
er a transfer of non-marital funds into a marital account subse-
quent to a separation transformed those funds into marital as-
sets."3 According to the superior court these deposits were
marital assets despite the fact that they accrued post separa-
tion.' The superior court determined that the husband's de-
posit of personal funds into a marital account converted the
deposited funds into property subject to equitable distribution
because proper division of the assets was not practical."5 The
supreme court held that the characterization of property as a
marital asset by default was not equitable."5 The court distin-
guished the cases relied on by the wife and the superior court to
establish that a transmutation occurred upon commingling be-
cause the cited cases all involved a pre-separation commingling."
528. Oaks, 638 A.2d at 211. The supreme court noted that because the trial
court's determination of marital assets was a factual one, the decision could only be
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. The court commented, "[wle are constrained to
agree" that the trial court's determination was not an abuse of discretion. Id.
629. Id. An expectancy of ownership does not affect equitable distribution. See
Gruver v. Gruver, 539 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). When his parents transferred
their shares, the expectancy was obliterated in favor of his sister. Oaks, 638 A.2d at
211.
530. Oaks, 638 A.2d at 211.
531. Id.
532. Id. The husband also properly applied the equipment's depreciation to his
personal return because the corporation's only holding was the land; the husband
was the owner of the equipment. Id.
533. Id. at 212.
534. Id.
535. Oaks, 638 A.2d at 212.
536. Id. The supreme court explained that in so holding, the superior court had
abused its discretion. Id. The wife had argued that the funds had to be considered
marital because there was no possible way to divide the funds between those ac-
quired pre and post separation. Id.
537. Id. See Lowry v. Lowry, 544 A.2d 972 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Winters v.
Winters, 512 A.2d 1211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that a commingling of marital
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding is significant be-
cause it eliminated an apparent confusion surrounding the ques-
tion of ownership of funds deposited in marital accounts after
separation. If the deposit occurs after a separation, the deposit-
ing party is entitled to the entire amount of the funds. The
court's holding does not impact existing law as it relates to the
ownership of funds deposited prior to separation. Funds ac-
quired after separation are not marital property regardless of
where they are deposited.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION-POST-SEPARA-
TION SPousAL BENEFrrs-Gordon v. Gordon, 647 A.2d 530 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that
post-divorce retirement incentives were too speculative to be
considered marital assets.
In, Gordon v. Gordon,5" the issue before the superior court
was whether retirement incentives received subsequent to sepa-
ration were marital property.5" The Gordons were married for
nineteen years; on August 2, 1985, a bifurcated divorce was
granted on the grounds of indignities.' " After the divorce was
granted, the wife filed suit alleging that the husband's retire-
ment incentives were marital property." The wife argued that
the retirement incentives were based upon the husband's prior
years of service to the company, most of which were marital
years.5 2 The court dismissed the wife's argument.' The
court classified these early retirement incentives as "unpredict-
able and fortuitous event[s] not contemplated during the mar-
riage."" Therefore, the assets should not be considered mari-
tal property."
The impact of this ruling was to solidify prior case law that
held post-separation early retirement incentives were not mari-
tal assets and therefore were not subject to equitable distribu-
tion.'
and non-marital assets into the same account transformed the non marital funds
into marital when the funds were commingled prior to separation).
538. 647 A.2d 530 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
539. Gordon, 647 A.2d at 538.
540. Id. at 532. A divorce decree had initially been granted in 1980, but the
wife appealed. Id. The superior court reversed and remanded due to the fact that
the trial court had failed to apply the 1980 Divorce Code. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Id. at 539.
544. Gordon, 647 A.2d at 539 (citations omitted).
545. Id.
546. See Edward Spaniel, Post-Separation Retirement Offer is not Included in
Duquesne Law Review
B. SPOUSAL SUPPORT
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-SPOUSAL SUPPORT-McKolanis v.
McKolanis, 644 A.2d 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)-The Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court held that a wife who leaves the marital
home because she discovers that her husband is a cross-dresser
is entitled to an award of spousal support.
In McKolanis v. McKolanis, 7 the principal issue before the
Pennsylvania Superior Court was whether a wife, who volun-
tarily left the marital home because her husband was an admit-
ted cross-dresser, was entitled to an award of spousal sup-
port."S The husband and wife had been married for nine years
when the husband reported to his wife that he had a proclivity
for cross-dressing. s9 The wife then left the husband."5 The
standard for awarding spousal support following a non-consensu-
al vacation of the marital home is whether the spouse's conduct
justified the withdrawal."' The court explained that no case
law existed regarding the question of cross-dressing as a legal
justification for abandoning the marital home.52 The court
ultimately held, after a lengthy discussion, that the wife was
justified in her departure and that spousal support should be
awarded.553
Judge Cercone explained that the sexual identity of one's
marital partner was crucial to the matrimonial relationship. "
A husband who concealed his cross-dressing from his wife and
then informed her of this proclivity and appeared in public in
female attire acted in a manner inconsistent with a wife's con-
ception of her status as a spouse. 5 Therefore, the acts on the
part of the husband justified the wife's departure and entitled
her to spousal support.'
The importance of the decision in McKolanis rests in the de-
tailed discussion used by the court to justify its conclusion rath-
Marital Property, PA. LAW WKLY, August 1, 1994, at 1; see also LaBuda v. LaBuda,
503 A.2d 971, 976 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
547. 644 A.2d 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
548. McKolanis, 644 A.2d at 1257.
549. Id. The husband informed the wife that he had been a cross-dresser prior
to their marriage. Id. The husband explained that he had informed his wife in order
to highlight their problems and encourage marital counseling. Id.
550. Id.
551. Id. The wife had the burden of Oroof. Id.
552. Id. at 1258 (citing Steinke v. Steinke, 357 A.2d 674 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)).





1995 PA Recent Developments - Domestic Relations
er than the actual decision reached by the court. The discussion
by the court exhibits the changing attitudes of the legal system
toward individual preference.
C. PATERNITY
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-PATERNITY-DeAngelo v. Murray, 638
A.2d 966 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the court could not require an alleged father to submit to a
third blood test without a showing that the previous tests were
defective or inaccurate.
In DeAngelo v. Murray," the defendant, the alleged father,
appealed a Pennsylvania Superior Court order requiring him to
submit to a third set of blood tests in an attempt to determine
paternity.M5 The first test performed established a ninety per-
cent chance that the defendant was the father. 5 After the re-
suits were reported to the court, further blood tests were ordered
that would analyze the blood by DNA fingerprinting; these tests
established that it would not be possible for the defendant to be
the father."0 The mother then requested a third test that the
defendant refused because substantial testing had already been
performed." Nonetheless, the trial court ordered that he sub-
mit to a third testing."2
The defendant filed an interlocutory appeal, and the superior
court affirmed the order; the defendant then appealed to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.' The issue before the court was
whether an alleged father could be directed to submit for addi-
tional blood testing when the results of the prior tests were
inconsistent.' The defendant argued that the trial court and
the superior court erred in granting a third test because the
mother failed to show that the first two tests were defective or
inaccurate."'
Chief Justice Nix, writing for the court, began his analysis by
explaining that this was a question of first impression for the
557. 638 A.2d 966 (Pa. 1994).
558. DeAngelo, 638 A.2d at 967.
559. Id. The first test examined the mother's, child's and alleged father's red




563. DeAngelo, 638 A.2d at 967.
564. Id.




Pennsylvania Supreme Court.' The mother contended that a
third test was required because of the alleged inaccuracies be-
tween the two prior tests."7 The Supreme Court held that she
failed to meet her burden because additional tests could only be
ordered if the last test administered was inaccurate.' The
court asserted that mere inconsistencies were not sufficient.' 9
In order to justify additional testing, a court must find that the
last test administered was defectively performed. 70 The court
therefore concluded that the mother had failed to meet her bur-
den of proof.6 7'
This case is important because it was a case of first impres-
sion for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The court adopted the
reasoning of several prior superior court cases in holding that
the burden of proving the necessity of an additional blood test is
on the requesting party. "72 That party must show that the pre-
vious test was not accurate and defective. An important corol-
lary to this holding was the court's determination that an incon-
sistency between prior tests does not, alone, meet the burden of
proving inaccuracy or defectiveness.
D. GRANDPARENTS VISITATION
DOMESTIC RELATIONS--GRANDPARENTS VISITATION RIGHTS-
CHILD BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK-Bishop v. PUller, 637 A.2d 976
(Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
definition of separated in the statute providing grandparents
with visitation rights does not require a legal relationship be-
tween the father and the mother in order for the grandparents
to have a right to visitation.
In Bishop v. Piler,T3 the paternal grandparents of a child
born out of wedlock petitioned the court for visitation rights
despite the fact that their son, the child's father, had no legal
relationship with the child or mother.174 The mother had been
566. Id.
567. Id. at 968.




572. See, e.g., Paroby v. Godek, 588 A.2d 967 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding
that the moving party must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
results of the first tests were inaccurate before an additional extraction may be
ordered); Koleski v. Park, 525 A.2d 405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
573. 637 A.2d 976 (Pa. 1994).
574. Bishop, 637 A.2d at 977. The father was listed on the birth certificate but
he never filed a declaration of paternity; nonetheless, it was undisputed that he was
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the primary provider and only parental figure since the child's
birth."7 " The paternal grandmother filed a petition for visita-
tion rights.
78
The issue before the supreme court in Piller was whether the
definition of "separated" in the domestic relations title of Penn-
sylvania Statute, section 5312, encompassed situations in which
the parents never entered into a legal relationship. 77 The
mother argued that separation meant that the parents of the
child had either been married and proceedings to dissolve the
marriage had been commenced or that the couple had cohabited
and maintained a lengthy relationship before separating.78
Justice Papadakos, writing for the court, rejected this argument
and contended that such an interpretation of separation would
be inconsistent with the stated purpose of the statute. 79 The
court highlighted the fact that section 5311 did not require that
the mother and father had previously been engaged in an ex-
tended relationship."' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court there-
fore affirmed the grant of visitation rights and explained that
the six month separation time did not imply the existence of a
relationship similar to that of marriage."' Thus, in this case
the six month period was measured from the birth of the
child. 2
The supreme court, in reaching its holding that the grandpar-
ents were entitled to visitation rights used sweeping language
about the importance of grandparents in the lives of the grand-
children.' The essence of the court's holding was that if the
court determined that spending time with a grandparent was in
the best interest of the child then a grandparent could be enti-
tled to visitation rights regardless of whether the parents of the
the father. Id. at 976.
575. Id. at 976.
576. Id. at 977; see 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5311-14 (Supp. 1994).
577. Bishop, 637 A.2d at 977. The act provides:
In all proceedings for dissolution, subsequent to the commencement of the
proceeding and continuing thereafter or when parents have been separated for
six months or more, the court may, upon application of the parent or grand-
parent of a party, grant reasonable partial custody or visitation rights, or
both, to the unmarried child if it finds that visitation rights would be in the
best interest of the child and would not interfere with the parent-child rela-
tionship ....
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5312.
578. Bishop, 637 A.2d at 977.
579. Id.
580. Id.
581. Id. at 978-79.
582. Id. at 978.
583. See Bishop, 637 A.2d at 978.
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child ever had an extended relationship. This case opens the
way for grandparents of a child born out of wedlock to request
visitation rights even if the child has had no relationship with
the grandparents' child."'
E. CUSTODY
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-CHILD CUSTODY-BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD-Robinson v. Robinson, 645 A.2d 836 (Pa.
1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a trial
court's custody determination of the best interest of the child
may only be reviewed by an appellate court for manifest unrea-
sonableness.
In Robinson v. Robinson, 5 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
addressed the issue of the appropriate standard for appellate re-
view of a trial court determination of the best interests of the
child in a custody hearing.' Mr. and Mrs. Robinson were mar-
ried in 1985, had a child in 1986, and were separated in
1989." 7 In 1989, the parties entered into a shared custody
agreement which allocated five days to be spent with the mother
and then three days with the father."' The mother subse-
quently remarried and requested a modification in the custody
agreement." 9 A hearing officer awarded primary physical cus-
584. Senator Greenleaf has proposed a revision to the Domestic Relations Code
which would provide a statutory avenue to allow grandparents to petition for full
custody. See S. 247, 178th Reg. Seas., Gen. Assem. (1993-94). Currently, grandpar-
ents may be awarded full custody, however, their burden of proof is the same as a
third party's. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5313 (Supp. 1994). Therefore, they must
demonstrate convincing reasons why the child's best interest would be served by
granting full custody to a non parent. See, e.g., R.A.R. v. T.M., 644 A.2d 767, 768
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). The proposed legislation would reduce the burden placed on
the grandparents to parity with those of the parents in a custody matter by adding
a new subsection to Title 23, section 5313 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Stat-
utes. S. 247, 178th Reg. Sess., Gen. Assem. (1993-94). The new subsection would
only apply to grandparents: who evidence genuine care and concern for the child, for
whom the child evidences genuine care and concern, whose relationship began either
with the consent of the parents or pursuant to a court order, who have assumed the
role of the child's parent and with whom the child has resided for at least twelve
months. Id. The bill also grants standing to the grandparents to initiate such an
action. Id.
Currently, the bill has passed the Senate and been forwarded to the House
Committee on Appropriations, where it remained at the close of the 178th session of
the General Assembly.
585. 645 A.2d 836 (Pa. 1994).
586. Robinson, 645 A.2d at 838.
587. Id. at 837.
588. Id.
589. Id.
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tody to the mother with summers spent with the father."" Pri-
or to the father's appeal, the mother moved the child to Flori-
da. 91 The trial court reversed the determination of the hearing
officer and awarded shared legal and physical custody.592 The
custody order gave the father primary physical custody during
the school year."8
The mother appealed the trial court's decision to the superior
court which reversed and reinstated the hearing officer's recom-
mendations holding that it was in the child's best interest to be
with the mother."9 The father appealed the decision to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court."5 The issue before the supreme
court was whether the superior court had exceeded its scope of
review.5 The supreme court, applying the superior court's ra-
tionale in Mumma v. Mumma,"9 7 explained that "unless the
trial court's ruling represents a gross abuse of discretion, [an
appellate court] will not interfere with its order awarding custo-
dy."
598
The court explained that the "paramount concern of the trial
court is the best interest of the child."5 9 The court asserted
that appellate interference was unwarranted if the trial court's
consideration of the child's best interest was careful and thor-
ough.' Therefore, the supreme court reversed the superior
court and reinstated the order of the trial court awarding prima-
ry custody to the father. 1
This decision is important because the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court established that the standard to be applied in custody
matters is the best interest of the child. The court's opinion
implies that when either parent is capable of caring for the child
no special consideration is to be given to the gender of the par-
ent. The opinion also is significant because the court adopted the
standard of review to be applied by courts looking at custody
decisions.'
590. Id.
591. Robinson, 645 A.2d at 837. An appeal from a hearing officer's determina-
tion is de novo to the court of common pleas. Id.
592. Id.
593. Id.
594. Id. The court noted that because the mother was unemployed she could
spend more time with the child. Id.
595. Id.
596. Robinson, 645 A.2A at 837.
597. 550 A.2d 1341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
598. Robinson, 645 A.2d at 837.
599. Id. at 838.
600. Id. (citations omitted).
601. Id.
602. There has also been a recent amendment to the Pennsylvania Rules of
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VI. Taxation
A. DECISIONS
TAXATION-PURELY PUBLIC CHARITY-PRIVATE NURSING
HOME-St. Margaret Seneca Place v. Allegheny Board of Proper-
ty Assessment, Appeals & Review, 640 A.2d 380 (Pa. 1994)-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a nursing home that
receives payment from all patients and expects to make a profit
in the current year nevertheless qualifies as a purely public
charity for real estate tax exemption purposes.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently redefined what
constituted a public charity for real estate tax exemption purpos-
es in In re St. Margaret Seneca Place v. Allegheny Board of Prop-
erty Assessment, Appeals & Review.' At issue in Seneca Place
was whether a nursing home qualified for tax exemption status
as a public charity when the home obtained payment from all of
its patients and projected excess annual revenue.'
In Seneca Place, a private nursing ,home applied for a tax
exemption for real estate.' The Tax Assessment Board denied
the nursing home's application, and the commonwealth court
affirmed that decision." The commonwealth court applied a
five part test in holding that the nursing home was ineligible for
tax exemption status as a public charity." The court held that
Civil Procedure regarding custody and visitation. On July 15, 1994 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court changed the rules as they relate to hearings for partial custody and
visitation. Hearing officers are now permitted to hear an action for custody or visi-
tation. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1915.4-1. A hearing officer may determine custody and
visitation cases unless the parties move the court for a hearing before a judge and
the issues to be heard are complex, lengthy, or there exist serious allegations ef-
fecting the child's welfare. Id.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1915.4-2 was added outlining the proce-
dure before a hearing officer for custody and visitation matters. This rule should
expedite matters relating to custody and visitation because of the availability of
hearing officers. See PA. R. CIrv. P. 1915.4-2. In light of the extensive authority given
hearing officers in the area of domestic relations this amendment appears to be a
logical extension.
603. 640 A.2d 380 (Pa. 1994).
604. Seneca Place, 640 A.2d at 382.
606. Id.
606. St. Margaret Seneca Place v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals &
Review, 604 A.2d 1119, 1126 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992), rev'd, 640 A.2d 380 (Pa. 1994).
607. Seneca Place, 604 A.2d at 1122.23. The five part test was established by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth.
See Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1985). An
institution qualifies as a public charity under the test when the institution: (1) ad-
vances a charitable purpose; (2) donates a substantial portion of its services, gratu-
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the nursing home was ineligible for tax exemption status as a
public charity, under the test because the home received pay-
ment from every patient and expected to make a profit in
1992.6
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the commonwealth
court's decision and held that the nursing home qualified for tax
exemption status as a public charity.' The court found that
although all of the nursing home's patients were insured, ap-
proximately forty-eight percent of its patients were on Medic-
aid.10 The court further found that the nursing home incurred
one third of the costs to care for the residents insured by Medic-
aid.61 Moreover, the court determined that an organization
could have surplus revenue and still qualify as a public charity
for tax exemption purposes.6" The court asserted that surplus
revenue was not synonymous with private profit."' 3 The court
compared the nursing home's projected excess revenue and its
indebtedness in determining that the home was not operating
for profit.614
itously; (3) benefits a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate
subjects of charity; (4) relieves the government of some of its burden and; (5) oper-
ates entirely free from profit motive. Hospital Utilization Project, 487 A.2d at 1317.
The commonwealth court found that the nursing home did not meet any of the re-
quirements to qualify for tax exemption status as a public charity. Seneca Place, 604
A.2d at 1126.
608. Seneca Place, 604 A.2d at 1124. The court found that all of the nursing
home's residents paid for their care. Id. at 1122. The court noted that 48.5% of the
residents were covered by Medicaid, 10.7% were covered by Medicare, 10.2% were
covered by Blue Cross, and 30.6% paid privately. id.
609. Seneca Place, 640 A.2d at 386.
610. Id. at 383.
611. Id. at 384.
612. Id. at 385.
613. Id.
614. Seneca Place, 640 A-2d at 385. For a further discussion of the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court's decision in Seneca Place, see Jonathan C. Parks, Recent




TIONAL TEST-Laurel Pipe Line Corp. v. Commonwealth, 642
A.2d 472 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the proceeds from the sale of a pipeline between a trans-
porter of petroleum and an ordinary consumer is not business
income under either the transactional or functional tests.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently interpreted the
definition of "business income" in Laurel Pipe Line Corp. v.
Commonwealth.""' The Laurel Pipe Line Corp. ("Laurel") was
an Ohio corporation that transported refined petroleum products
through pipelines in Pennsylvania and Ohio. 16 Laurel sold one
of its inoperative pipelines, and subsequently distributed the
proceeds from the sale of the pipeline to the company's share-
holders. 1" At issue in the case was whether the revenue from
the sale of the pipeline was business income under the Pennsyl-
vania Tax Code. 18
After applying two different tests the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the revenue was non-business income. 19 The
court first applied a transactional test.20 The court defined
business income under the transactional test as income acquired
by a taxpayer in the normal course of his business. 21 The
court held that the proceeds acquired by Laurel through the sale
of the pipeline constituted non-business income under the trans-
actional test because Laurel did not normally sell pipelines. '
The court also applied a functional test and concluded that
the proceeds from the sale of the pipeline were non-business
income."3 The court defined business income under the func-
tional test as income obtained by a taxpayer through the sale of
an asset which previously produced business income for him.'
615. 642 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1994).
616. Laurel, 642 A.2d at 473.
617. Id.
618. Id. at 474. The Pennsylvania Tax Code divides business income into two
categories: business income and non-business income. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401
(3)2.(a)(1)(A) (1990). The Tax Code defines business income as: "income arising from
transactions and activity in the regular course of a taxpayer's trade or business, and
includes income from tangible and non-tangible property if the acquisition, manage-
ment, and disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer's regu-
lar trade or business operations." PA, STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401 (3)2.(aX1)(A).
619. Laurel, 642 A.2d at 474.
620. Id.
621. id.
622. id. at 475.
623. Id.
624. Laurel, 642 A.2d at 475.
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The court held that Laurel's proceeds did not constitute business
income under the functional test because the pipeline was inop-
erative and did not produce business income for Laurel before it
was sold.6'
TAXATION-REALTY TRANSFER TAX-INTRA-FAMILY EXEMP-
TION-Leigh v. Commonwealth, 648 A-2d 1346 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994)--The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that a
transfer of property to a trust which named a non-family mem-
ber as a contingent beneficiary of a portion of the principal still
qualifies under the intra-family exemption to the Pennsylvania
Realty Transfer Tax where that bequest could be satisfied by the
personalty held in the trust.
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania recently clarified
the scope of the intra-family exemption to the Realty Transfer
Tax 2. in Leigh v. Commonwealth.27 In Leigh, a taxpayer cre-
ated a trust and placed all of his assets, including his real prop-
erty, into the trust.6' Under the terms of the trust, the taxpay-
er and his wife were to retain control of the principal of the
trust for life, and the survivor would have a power of appoint-
ment." The trust provided that if the survivor failed to exer-
cise the power of appointment, a small portion of the principal
in the trust would pass to Planned Parenthood, and the remain-
ing principal would pass to the taxpayer's children in equal
shares."o
At issue in Leigh was whether the bequest to Planned Parent-
hood subjected the transfer of the real property to the Pennsyl-
vania Realty Transfer Tax because a non-family member was
named as a contingent beneficiary under the trust. 1 The court
determined that the small gift to Planned Parenthood would
most likely pass from the personal property held in the trust,
625. Id.
626. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 8101-C to 8102-D (1990).
627. 648 A.2d 1346 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994)
628. Leigh, 648 A.2d at 1347. The trust contained some stock, a mortgage, a
life insurance policy, and a home. Id. The total value of the assets in the trust was
$520,000. Id.
629. Id.
630. Id. The terms of the trust provided that if either taxpayer or his wife
defaulted in their power of appointment, the greater of 1% or $5,000 would be con-
veyed to Planned Parenthood. Id.
631. Id. at 1348. The Tax Reform Code provides that every person who
transfers title in real estate shall be subject to a state tax on the value of the real
estate. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 8102-C. However, intra-family transfers are exempt




and not the real property.62 Therefore, the court held that the
transfer of real property to the trust qualified under the intra-
family exemption to the Realty Transfer Tax.'
B. LEGISLATION
Inheritance Tax-Exemption for Spousal Transfers
The Pennsylvania legislature recently amended the
Commonwealth's Inheritance Tax Laws to eliminate inheritance
taxes on spousal transfers within three years of death.' The
amendment reduces the tax on spousal transfers to three per-
cent for transfers occurring between July 1, 1994 and January 1,
1996."' The amendment also provides for a one percent an-
nual reduction in the tax until January 1, 1998, when it will
then be completely eliminated."'
Bank and Trust Company Shares Tax
The Pennsylvania Tax Code was recently amended to include
a method of state apportionment for the Bank and Trust Compa-
ny Shares Tax. 7 A bank or trust company, subject to a simi-
lar tax in another state, may apportion its taxable amount of
shares under the amendment."5 Prior to the amendment, the
code did not provide detailed guidelines for proper apportion-
ment under the tax.
Business Privilege Tax
The Pennsylvania General Assembly recently amended the
Business Privilege Tax." The amendment provides for an an-
nual tax rate of 10.5% of a corporation's taxable income through
632. Leigh, 648 A.2d at 1348.
633. Id. The court also noted that if the bequest to Planned Parenthood could
be considered a devise of realty, the Realty Transfer Tax would not apply because
Planned Parenthood disclaimed any interest in the realty. Id. at 1349.
634. 1994 Pa. Laws 48, § 2116 (to be codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§
2116(a), (b.1), (e)).
635. 1994 Pa. Laws 48, § 2116(a)(1.1)(i).
636. Id. § 2116(a)(1.1)(iii).
637. 1994 Pa. Laws 48, § 701.4 (to be codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §
701.4).
638. Id.
639. 1994 Pa. Laws 48, § 402 (to be codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7402).
The tax is imposed upon corporations for the privilege of doing business, owning
property, or carrying on activities in the Commonwealth. Id.
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1996."o The tax rate then decreases to an annual rate of 9.99%
of a corporation's taxable income in 1997." The amendment
also provides for an annual surtax of 1.75% of a corporation's
taxable income following 1997.2
Car Rental Tax
The Pennsylvania General Assembly recently amended the
Commonwealth's tax laws to provide for a two per-cent tax on
private car rentals.' Under the amendment, any individual
renting a car from a car rental company for twenty-nine days or
less will be taxed an additional 2% of the car's rental price.'
Liquid Fuels Tax
The Pennsylvania General Assembly recently amended the
Commonwealth's Liquid Fuels Tax.' The amendment pro-
vides that money collected from the tax may now be used to
build access ramps on state highways for the disabled.' Prior
to the amendment, the money collected from the tax could only
be used to maintain highways and bridges within the Common-
wealth."7
Business Trusts
The Pennsylvania General Assembly recently eliminated the
tax exemption for business trusts under the Pennsylvania tax
code.' Prior to the amendment, money held in a business




643. 1994 Pa. Laws 48, 1 1602-A (to be codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §
8602-A).
644. Id.
645. 1994 Pa. Laws 57, § 10 (to be codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §
2611(j)). The tax is imposed upon gasoline sold by distributors within the Common-
wealth. Id.
646. Id.
647. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2611j (1964 & Supp. 1994).
648. 1994 Pa. Laws 48, § 401 (to be codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §
7401(1)1).
649. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7401 (1990).
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Capital Stock Tax
The Pennsylvania General Assembly recently amended the
formula for computing capital stock value.' Under the amend-
ment, $75,000 is deducted from the average net income formula
to calculate the capital stock value. 1 Prior to the amendment,
$50,000 was deducted from the average net income formula to
calculate the capital stock value.'
VII. Labor Law
LABOR-ARBITRATION-SALARY INCREASES FOR MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYEES-FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED MUNICIPALITIES
AcT-City of Farrell v. Fraternal Order of Police, 645 A.2d 1294
(Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an arbi-
tration award which increases the salaries of certain municipal
employees does not violate the Financially Distressed Municipal-
ities Act.
In City of Farrell v. Fraternal Order of Police,' the City of
Farrell (the "City") was declared a financially distressed munici-
pality pursuant to the Financially Distressed Municipalities Act
("Act 47").' In accordance with Act 47, a coordinator prepared
a recovery plan for the municipality. 5 Subsequently, an arbi-
tration award which provided for a $1,000 salary increase for
each bargaining unit was entered, due to a failure of the City
and the Fraternal Order of Police (the "Appellant") to renegoti-
ate their current collective bargaining agreement." The City
appealed the award on the basis that it violated the Act 47 re-
covery plan which required increases in labor costs to not exceed
2 1/2 % each year. 7 The City argued that the award was un-
enforceable under section 252 of Act 47 which provided that an
arbitration settlement entered after the adoption of the plan
650. 1994 Pa. Laws 48, § 601 (to be codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §
7601(a)).
651. Id.
652. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7601(a) (1990).
653. 645 A.2d 1294 (Pa. 1994).
654. City of Farrell, 645 A.2d at 1295-96. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§
11701.101 to 11701.501 (Supp. 1994) (the Financially Distressed Municipalities Act).
655. City of Farrell, 645 A.2d at 1296.
656. Id. at 1295.
657. Id. at 1296.
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could not violate or differ from the provisions of the Act 47 re-
covery plan.
68
The commonwealth court held that pursuant to the Statutory
Construction Acte 9 and the plain language of section 252, sec-
tion 252 did not per se prohibit salary increases during execution
of the recovery plan.' The commonwealth court also conclud-
ed that the Act 47 recovery plan did not specifically address
police salaries."6 1 The court therefore remanded the case to the
trial court for testimony to determine whether the arbitrator im-
properly used his discretion to determine how the city would
expend its resources and whether the arbitration award was in
contravention of the recovery plan. 2
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania asserted that
the commonwealth court correctly determined that the recovery
plan did not contain a provision which limited police sala-
ries.' However, the court held that it was error for the com-
monwealth court to remand the case for additional testimony
and reversed that portion of the order.'
The court explained that Article V of the recovery plan enti-
tled "Discussion and Recommendations," contained subheadings
which in turn contained a discussion of particular problems and
a proposed resolution. 5 Immediately after the discussion and
proposed resolution was a list of recommendations which the
court held section 252 of Act 47 prohibited from being violated,
expanded or diminished by the arbitration award.' The court
opined that the coordinator separated the recommendations from
the text so that those implementing the recommendations could
identify them more easily."7 Due to the fact that the plan did
not contain a recommendation which limited police salaries, the
court held that the arbitration award did not violate section 252
of Act 47 or the recovery plan.' The court therefore concluded
that the commonwealth court should not have remanded the
case for further testimony."
658. Id. (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11701.252).
659. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921 (1993).
660. City of Farrell, 645 A.2d at 1297.
661. Id.
662. Id. (citing Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Farrell, 590 A.2d 1327, 1332
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)).





668. City of Farrell, 645 A.2d at 1299.




Harbor Creek School District v. Harbor Creek Education Associ-
ation, 640 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the elimination of an extracurricular position
does not violate the collective bargaining agreement between the
teachers and the school district and therefore is not subject to
arbitration.
In Harbor Creek School District v. Harbor Creek Education
Association,70 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed
whether the elimination of an athletic director position violated
the collective bargaining agreement. In Harbor Creek, the posi-
tion of the athletic director in the Harbor Creek School District
(the "School District") had been historically held by a teacher
who was a member of the bargaining unit represented by the
Harbor Creek Education Association (the "Association").671
Eventually, the School District had to change the job description
of the athletic director to include responsibilities other than
athletics. 72 The Association subsequently filed a grievance
challenging the new description which was sustained by an arbi-
trator.73
Thereafter, the School District created a new supervisory
position titled, Assistant Principal for Student and Supplemen-
tal Activities. 74 The new position encompassed the responsibil-
ities previously held by the athletic director. 78 Once again, the
Association filed a grievance alleging that the elimination of the
athletic director position constituted a violation of the bargain-
ing agreement in that it transferred bargaining unit work to
non-bargaining unit employees.78 After concluding that the
grievance was arbitrable, an arbitrator sustained the grievance
on the merits. 77 The school district filed an application to va-
following statement in Article V of the plan constituted a recommendation: "[tlhere
do not appear to be the resources for increases in either base pay or fringes, howev-
er they are expressed, in the near future. This will be a harsh reality at the bar-
gaining table for the foreseeable future." Id. (Zappala, J., dissenting). He asserted
that if this recommendation were violated state funding to Farrell could be suspend-
ed. Id. at 1300.
670. 640 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1994).





676. Harbor Creek, 640 A.2d at 900.
677. Id. at 900-01.
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cate the arbitration award on the grounds that the subject mat-
ter of the dispute was not arbitrable under the collective bar-
gaining agreement because it applied only to "professional em-
ployees. 
78
The commonwealth court reversed the award and held that
when teachers were working in extracurricular activities, they
were not functioning as "teachers," and in that capacity were not
"professional employees" who could invoke the grievance proce-
dures in the collective bargaining agreement. 79
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the common-
wealth court and explained that the agreement, although not
addressing whether employees performing extra-curricular work
could invoke procedures which were available to them in their
professional capacities, did provide that after-hour assignments
performed by teachers were "non-teaching duties.' The su-
preme court, therefore, concluded that when teachers were per-
forming non-teaching duties, they were not functioning as "pro-
fessional employees," and thus were not within the arbitration
provision of the collective bargaining agreement."s In
conclusion, the court held that the elimination of the athletic
director position was not subject to arbitration.S
678. Id.
679. Id. at 901 (quoting Harbor Creek School District v. Harbor Creek Educa-
tion Association, 606 A.2d 666 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992)).
680. Harbor Creek, 640 A.2d at 902.
681. Id.
682. Id. Justice Papadakos filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the majority
failed to take into consideration the court's decision in Leechburg Area School Dis-
trict where the court concluded that matters covered by an arbitration provision in a
collective bargaining agreement were to be determined by the arbitrator. Id. at 903
(Papadakos, J., dissenting) (citing Leechburg Area School District v. Dale, 424 A.2d
1309, 1312-13 (Pa. 1981)).
Moreover, Justice Papadakos argued that the athletic director position con-
stituted bargaining unit work because Appendix B to the agreement included a
schedule of coaching salaries including the athletic director position, and Appendix D
to the agreement addressed "supplemental positions' including "head





ENviRONMENTAL LAW-CIVIL PROCEDUREINDISPENSABLE PAR-
TY-CRY, Inc. v. Mill Service, Inc, 640 A.2d 372 (Pa. 1994)-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Department of Envi-
ronmental Resources is an indispensable party and must be
joined in all actions by private citizens under the Air Pollution
Control Act, the Clean Streams Law and the Hazardous Sites
Cleanup Act.
In CRY, Inc. v. Mill Service, Inc.,' the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that the DER was an indispensable party to a
citizen's lawsuit against an alleged polluter under the Air Pollu-
tion Control Act, the Clean Streams Law, and the Hazardous
Sites Cleanup Act.' In CRY, the plaintiffs brought suit
against the defendant under the Air Pollution Control Act,'
the Clean Streams Law," and the Hazardous Sites Cleanup
Act, 7 claiming that they sustained injuries from chemicals
that were being discharged by defendant's hazardous waste
treatment plant.' The trial court sustained defendant's pre-
liminary objections and required the plaintiff to file an amended
complaint joining the DER as an indispensable party.' The
commonwealth court reversed the decision of the trial court and
held that the DER was not an indispensable party.89
On appeal, the supreme court was asked to define an indis-
pensable party, and was also asked to determine whether the
DER was an indispensable party to the action."' The court
noted that in determining whether a party was indispensable to
an action the focus was whether justice could be achieved in the
absence of that party. 2 The court held that because the action
could affect the DER's regulatory activity, it would be unjust to
proceed without joining the DER and therefore the DER was an
683. 640 A.2d 372 (Pa. 1994).
684. CRY, 640 A.2d at 373.
685. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 4001-15 (1993).
686. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1 to 691.1001 (1993).
687. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6020.101 to 6020.1305 (1993).
688. CRY, 640 A.2d at 373.
689. Id.
690. Id. at 375 (citing CRY, Inc. v. Mill Service, Inc., 619 A.2d 807 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1994)).
691. CRY. 640 A.2d at 373.
692. Id. at 375.
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indispensable party.93 Therefore, the court concluded that the
DER would be essential in carrying out any judicial remedy.'s
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-JURISDICTION-ENVIRONMENTAL HEAR-
ING BOARD-Machipongo Land & Coal Co., Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 648 A.2d 767 (Pa. 1994)-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the Environmental Hearing Board did
not have jurisdiction to preside over a pre-enforcement challenge
to an Environmental Quality Board regulation.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania clarified the scope of the
jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board
in Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth." In
Machipongo, the appellants challenged an Environmental Quali-
ty Board regulation which designated a portion of their land as
unsuitable for mining.'" The appellees filed preliminary objec-
tions claiming that the commonwealth court was without juris-
diction to hear the case."' The commonwealth court sustained
the appellee's preliminary objections, and transferred the case to
the Environmental Hearing Board. 98 The parties agreed that
the Environmental Hearing Board was without jurisdiction to
hear the case.'"
At issue in Machipongo, was whether the commonwealth
court had authority to vest the Environmental Hearing Board
with jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement challenge to an Envi-
ronmental Quality Board regulation."e The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court reversed the decision of the commonwealth court
and held that the Environmental Hearing Board did not have
jurisdiction to preside over a pre-enforcement challenge to an
Environmental Quality Board regulation.7 1 The court asserted
that the commonwealth court improperly attempted to expand
the jurisdiction of the Environmental Hearing Board."°2 The
693. Id. at 376.
694. Id. The court determined that the DER could withhold permits necessary
to carry out remedies. Id. The court also found that the DER could commence other
actions with identical or similar issues. Id.
695. 648 A.2d 767 (Pa. 1994).
696. Machipongo, 648 A.2d at 768. The appellants challenged a section of the
Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act that provides that property may
be designated as unsuitable for all land mining operations if the operations would
cause substantial damage to the environment or to existing resources. Id. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.4e(b) (Supp. 1994).
697. Machipongo, 648 A.2d at 768.
698. Id.
699. Id. at 769.
700. Id.
701. Id. at 770.
702. Machipongo, 648 A.2d at 770. The court noted that the "primary jurisdic-
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court determined that the Environmental Hearing Board only
had jurisdiction to rule on the validity of an Environmental
Quality Board regulation after the Department of Environmen-
tal Resources had undertaken a regulatory enforcement action
under that regulation.7 "3 The court determined that the parties
were seeking pre-enforcement review of an Environmental Qual-
ity Board regulation.7 Therefore, the court held that the Envi-
ronmental Hearing Board did not have jurisdiction to preside
over the case.05
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES-FACILITY
EXPANSION-Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 634 A.2d 1109 (Pa.
1993)-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a party who
was licensed to operate a hazardous waste facility could not be
charged with operating a hazardous waste facility without a
permit when the operator expands the facility in violation of the
permit.
In Commonwealth v. Scarpone,7" the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania settled a conflict between the Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court and the Pennsylvania Superior Court regard-
ing whether a licensed operator of a hazardous waste facility
could be charged with operating the facility without a per-
mit.07 The court held that a party who was licensed to operate
a hazardous waste facility and who expanded the facility in
violation of the permit, could not be charged with operating it
without a permit.7" In Scarpone, the defendant was the gener-
al manager of a licensed waste disposal facility.", An inspector
from the Department of Environmental Resources (the "DER')
discovered that high levels of hazardous substances were escap-
ing from the facility.710 DER officials informed the defendant
that the facility was not permitted to handle hazardous wastes
tion doctrine does not allow a court to refer a case to an agency which lacks express
statutory authority to hear the case." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Butler Cty. Mush-
room Farm, 454 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1982)).
703. Machipongo, 648 A.2d at 770. The Environmental Hearing Board's juris-
diction is limited to post-enforcement review of Environmental Quality Board regula-
tions. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.4(b).
704. Machipongo, 648 A.2d at 770.
705. Id.
706. 634 A.2d 1109 (Pa. 1993).
707. Scarpone, 634 A.2d at 1112.
708. Id.
709. Id. at 1110.
710. Id. at 1111. The inspector took samples from two of the facility's pipes. Id.
The samples contained a high concentration of hazardous substances. Id.
602 Vol. 33:523
1995 PA Recent Developments - Environmental Law 603
until the matter was resolved."' Subsequently, the facility en-
tered into an agreement with the DER officials to apply for a
water quality permit that limited the amount of chemicals that
could be discharged from the facility.71 The defendant also
agreed to build a treatment plant for the facility if the dis-
charged hazardous substances exceeded the permissible limita-
tions.71
Subsequently, a solid waste specialist for the DER inspected
the facility."" The inspector gathered samples from the facility
and observed that the discharge flow, in the pipe where the
original samples were taken, had lessened.71 The inspector
discovered that the facility was instead rerouting the hazardous
substances to a hidden location in the facility.71 The defendant
was charged and convicted of violating various Pennsylvania
criminal statutes, including assisting in the operation of a haz-
ardous waste disposal facility without a permit.7 7
. At issue in Scarpone, was whether a party who was licensed
to operate a hazardous waste facility could be charged with
operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit when he
expanded the facility in violation of the conditions of the per-
mit.71 ' The court reversed the conviction and held that the
charge was improper."9 The court noted that there were spe-
cific penalties provided in Pennsylvania statutes for violating
the conditions of a permit.72 The court determined that the fa-
711. Id.
712. Scarpone, 634 A.2d at 1111.
713. Id.
714. Id.
715. Id. The inspector was unable to smell any hazardous substances in the
area where the samples were previously taken. Id. The inspector also noticed that
the flow of hazardous substances had significantly decreased. Id.
716. Id. The inspector noticed that there was no discharge flow coming from
the pipe. Id. The inspector climbed down into the pipe, and discovered that it had
been capped. Id. The inspector also discovered that defendant had sent the hazard-
ous substances through an elbow pipe, to an unknown pit. Id.
717. Scarpone, 634 A.2d at 1112. The criminal penalties section of the Solid
Waste Management Act provides that, 'any person who stores, transports, treats, or
disposes of hazardous waste within the Commonwealth in violation of section 401, or
in violation of any order of the department [DER] shall be guilty of a felony in the
second degree." 35 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.606(f) (1993). The defendant was
also convicted of obstructing the operation of law and other governmental functions.
Scarpone, 634 A.2d at 1112. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5101 (1983). Finally, the
defendant was convicted of criminal conspiracy. Scarpone, 634 A.2d at 1112. See 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 903 (1983).
718. Scarpone, 634 A.2d at 1112.
719. Id.
720. Id. The Solid Waste Management Act provides that, "a violation of any
term or condition of any permit, shall constitute a public nuisance." PA. STAT ANN.
tit. 35, § 6018.601(a).
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cility violated the conditions of the permit by rerouting the haz-
ardous wastes to a hidden location.72' However, the court re-
fused to conclude that the facility was operating a hazardous
waste facility without a permit by rerouting the hazardous sub-
stances to a hidden location. 2
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RE-
SPONSE COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT-INDEMNITY AGREE-
MENT-RETROACTIVITY-Beazer East Inc., v. Mead Corp., 34
F.3d 206 (3d. Cir. 1994)-The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that an indemnity agreement, entered into prior to
the enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), can be used to
limit liability for CERCLA violations. Further, the court held
that the application of an indemnification agreement to
CERCLA liability should be interpreted pursuant to state law.
In Beazer East v. Mead Corp.,"z the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that an indemnity agreement
could be used to protect the indemnitee from liability under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"),a even though the agreement was
entered into prior to the enactment of CERCLA.72 The court
also held that state law rather than federal law must be applied
to interpret indemnity provisions under CERCLA.726
In Beazer East, the Mead Corporation sold a coke manufactur-
ing plant to Beazer East, Inc.727 The sales agreement between
the parties contained an indemnification provision which provid-
ed that the buyer, or his predecessor, would reimburse the seller
for losses and liabilities incurred after the sale of the plant.7"
Subsequent to the sale of the plant, Congress enacted CERCLA,
and the plant was later cited with various CERCLA viola-
tions.' The Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") is-
721. Scarpone, 634 A.2d at 1112.
722. Id.
723. 34 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 1994).
724. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
725. Beazer East, 34 F.3d at 213.
726. Id.
727. Id. at 208.
728. Id. The parties' sales agreement required that the buyer and its successors
assume and perform, "[oibligations of the Coke plant to comply from and after the
Closing Date with all terms and conditions of any . . . solid waste disposal permit,
license or order, hereafter issued by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency." Id.
729. Id. at 209.
Vol. 33:523
1995 PA Recent Developments - Environmental Law 605
sued an environmental order forcing Beazer East, Inc. to clean
up the facility.7 0 Beazer East, Inc. cleaned the facility and
brought an action for contribution against the seller under the
sales agreement. 3'
At issue in Beazer East was whether an indemnification
agreement which was entered into before the enactment of
CERCLA could indemnify a party from CERCLA liability." 2
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with other circuit
courts that an indemnity agreement entered into prior to the
enactment of CERCLA could apply to CERCLA liability.'
The court also addressed the issue of whether state or federal
law applied in interpreting an indemnification agreement under
CERCLA.7' The court held that the indemnification agreement
should be interpreted according to state law.' The court de-
termined that there was no need for a uniform federal law to
interpret indemnification provisions under CERCLA." The
court asserted that federal programs would not be frustrated by
interpreting provisions pertaining to CERCLA liability under
state law."7 Noting that commercial relationships under state
law would be disrupted if a uniform federal law was created to
interpret indemnification provisions under CERCLA, the court
held that state law should be applied. 3
730. Beazer East, 34 F.3d at 210.
731. Id.
732. Id. at 211.
733. Id. The court adopted the holding of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
id. (citing Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Leflon Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d 321, 327
(7th Cir. 1994)).
734. Beazer East, 34 F.3d at 211.
735. Id. at 214. The court utilized a three part test to determine whether to
apply state or federal law. Id. This test was established by the United States Su-
preme Court in Kimbell Foods. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715,
728 (1979). The test to determine whether state law or federal law should be ap-
plied to interpret a federal statute is: (1) whether the issue requires a nationally
uniform body of law; (2) whether the application of state law would frustrate specific
objectives of federal programs; and (3) whether the application of federal law would
disrupt commercial relationships predicated upon state law. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S.
at 728.
736. Beazer East, 34 F,3d at 212.
737. Id. at 213.
738. Id. at 213.14.
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-SURFACE MINING CONSERVATION AND
RECLAMATION ACT-ADEQUATE WATER SUPPLY-Carlson Mining
Co. v. Commonwealth, 639 A.2d 1332 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994)-The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that a
mining company that permanently deprives a landowner of his
water supply is responsible for replacing the landowner's water
supply and paying for the landowner's increased costs in main-
taining the water supply.
In Carlson Mining Co. v. Commonwealth,739 the Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania addressed whether a mining com-
pany that interfered with a landowner's water supply was re-
quired to permanently pay the increased expense of the
landowner's water costs under the Pennsylvania Surface Mining
Conservation and Reclamation Act (the "Mining Act").74 In
Carlson, the Carlson Mining Company (the "Company") conduct-
ed surface coal mining operations pursuant to a mining permit
issued by the DER.74 As a condition of the permit, the DER
required the Company to replace the water supply for a neigh-
boring landowner. 2 Pursuant to the DER's order, the Compa-
ny installed a well and a water treatment system for the land-
owner.74 The new water system increased the cost of the
landowner's water supply by two hundred dollars per year.7"
The DER then issued another order which required the Compa-
ny to pay the increased costs of the landowner's water supply
each year.745
At issue in Carlson was whether the Company was required
to provide for the increased costs of the landowner's water sup-
ply on a permanent basis under the Mining Act.7' The court
held that a mine operator could be required to permanently
replace a landowner's water supply and pay the landowner's
739. 639 A.2d 1332 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
740. Carlson, 639 A.2d at 1333. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1396.1 to
1396.31 (Supp. 1994).
741. Carlson, 639 A.2d at 1333.
742. Id. The landowners lived next to the Company's operations. Id. Their wa-
ter supply came from a spring. Id. The DER determined that the mining operations




746. Carlson, 639 A.2d at 1334. Section 87.119 of the DER rules and regula-
tions provides that, "[tihe operator of any mine which affects a water supply by
contamination, pollution diminution or interruption shall restore or replace the affect-
ed water supply with an alternate source, adequate in water quality and water
quantity for the purposes served by the supply.* 25 PA. CODE § 87.119 (1994).
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increased operation costs when the mine operator permanently
deprived the landowner of his water supply.747 The court noted
that the Mining Act required a mining company to provide an
adequate water supply to any landowner whose water the com-
pany contaminated or polluted.7
The court determined that the cost of the water supply had to
be considered in determining what constituted an adequate
water supply.74 The court recognized that the legislature en-
acted the Mining Act to protect landowners from the hardships
associated with the loss of their water supply by requiring sur-
face mine operators to replace the water supplies which were
affected by their mining operations.' Therefore, the court
held that a mining company which permanently deprived a
landowner of his water supply was responsible for replacing the
landowner's water supply, and for permanently paying the in-
creased maintenance costs of that water supply.''
747. Carlson, 639 A.2d at 1335-36.
748. Id. at 1335.
749. Id.
750. Id. at 1334.
751. Id. at 1336. The Pennsylvania Legislature General Assembly promulgated
an act amending the Pennsylvania Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act
(the "Mining Act"). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1396.1 to 1396.31 (Supp. 1994).
The amendment requires a mining operator who contaminates a public or private
water supply to replace the water supply. Act No. 1994-54 § 5.1 (to be codified at
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.5a). The statute now provides that any mine operator
who affects a water supply by contamination, diminution, or interruption must re-
store the affected supply with an alternative source which adequately replaces the
supply. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406. The amendment also provides that if the
mine operator does not replace the contaminated water supply with a temporary
water within twenty-four hours of when the contaminated water is discovered, the
DER shall order the mine operator to provide temporary water within twenty-four
hours. Act No. 1994-54, § 5.2 (aX3) (to be codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §
1406.5b(3)).
The Pennsylvania legislature also amended the state's mining laws to require
mine operators to replace buildings and other structures which were damaged during
mining operations. Act No. 1994-54, § 5.4 (to be codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §
1406.5d).
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IX. Estates and Trusts
A. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
TRUSTS-USE OF TRUST PRINCIPAL FOR MEDICAL EXPENS-
ES-Estate of Rosenberg v. Department of Welfare, 644 A.2d 215
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994)-The Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court held that the principal of a trust that had a single benefi-
ciary can be considered as an available resource to pay the
beneficiary's medical expenses.
In Estate of Rosenberg v. Department of Welfare,75 Louis
Rosenberg executed a will on November 10, 1972 that contained
a testamentary trust for the benefit of his wife.7" The terms of
the trust directed the trustees to pay the income to his wife for
life.'" The trust also gave the trustees discretion to distribute
the principal for the wife's medical and surgical expenses and
other unusual needs. 55 In 1992, an application was filed on
behalf of the wife for medical assistance.7' On the application
the wife included the terms of the trust and the amount of its
principal.6 7
The Department of Public Welfare (the "DPW") denied the
application because the wife's available resources exceeded the
minimum.7 8 The wife then appealed."9 The primary issue on
appeal was whether the DPW erred in considering the principal
of the trust as an available resource."' The estate argued that
the grant of discretion to the trustees allowed them to preserve
the principal rather than dissipate it for the benefit of the
DPW.
761
Judge McGinley, writing for the commonwealth court, ex-
plained that in order to determine whether the principal was an
available resource, the court had to look to the testator's intent
to determine whether such funds were to be utilized as a re-
752. 644 A.2d 215 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
753. Rosenberg, 644 A.2d at 215.
754. Id. The specific language of the trust read, "[wihile my wife, Mary, is
alive, the trustees are authorized, in their sole discretion, to use principal for the
comfort, welfare, and maintenance and support, for educational requirements, medical
and surgical expenses, and other unusual needs of my said wife." Id. at 216.
755. Id. at 215.
756. Id. at 216.
757. Id.
758. Rosenberg, 644 A.2d at 216.
759. Id. The wife died prior to a resolution of the appeal, and the action was
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source.7' The court concluded that the terms of the trust clear-
ly indicated that the husband had intended for the trust to be
used to pay the wife's medical expenses."' The court then dis-
tinguished two recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases that
held that trust income was not an available resource.7 The
court noted that there were two primary differences between the
case before the court and the prior cases.7" The court first as-
serted that the prior cases had multiple life beneficiaries while
the trust in question had only one.7" In addition, the court ex-
plained that the beneficiaries in the other trusts were receiving
assistance prior to the creation of the trust.787 Therefore, the
court opined that the testator intended that the principal of the
trust be available so that his wife would not have to rely on
public assistance.7
This decision renders it virtually impossible to construct a
trust which gives the trustees discretion in applying trust princi-
ple for expenses that will not be considered in determining the
availability of medical assistance. If only one beneficiary is
named and that beneficiary was not on medical assistance at the
time of the trust's creation, then the trust will almost certainly
be a factor.
B. JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
INTER VIVOS GIFrS-REVOCATION-JOINT ACCOUNTS-In re
Estate of Heske, 647 A.2d 243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)-The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court held that a written intention that a
joint account was not to be considered an inter vivos gift is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption that a joint account is
the property of the survivor.
In In re Estate of Heske,7 9 an action was brought by a resid-
uary legatee under the decedent's will to have several joint bank
accounts declared testamentary property. 70 The accounts were
created in the names of the decedent and her son in 1989, and
762. Id.
763. Rosenberg, 644 A.2d at 216.
764. Id. (citing Snyder v. Dep't Pub. Welfare, 598 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1991) and
Lang v. DPW, 528 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1987)).
765. Rosenberg, 644 A.2d at 216-17.
766. Id.
767. Id. at 217.
768. Id.
769. 647 A.2d 243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
770. Heske, 647 A.2d at 244.
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were funded exclusively by the decedent.771 Shortly after exe-
cuting her will, the decedent explained in writing that the joint
bank accounts were established for her convenience and they
were not intended as inter vivos gifts to her son."' The writing
further indicated that the ownership of the accounts was to be in
her name only.77 The superior court held that this evidence
did not overcome the presumption that the contents of joint
accounts were to be passed to the surviving owner.77
The court's decision makes joint accounts a valid inter vivos
transfer even if the individual who created the accounts at-
tempts to treat those accounts differently for testamentary pur-
poses. An individual who wishes to revoke the inter vivos trans-
fer must do so by revoking the joint nature of the account; a
letter of intention will be insufficient.
INTER Vivos GiFTS-JOINT ACCOUNT-CONFIDENTIAL RELATION-
SHIP-In re Estate of Meyers, 642 A.2d 525 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994)-The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a confiden-
tial relationship does not rebut the presumption that a joint
account is owned by the survivor.
In In re Estate of Meyers,"' the decedent had added the
name of her neighbor to several bank accounts during her life-
time and the executor filed a petition to recover the assets for
the estate.77 The grounds for the petition were that a confi-
dential relationship existed between the neighbor and the dece-
dent because the neighbor had held an irrevocable power of
attorney from the decedent.777 While the trial court found that
a confidential relationship did exist between the neighbor and
771. Id.
772. Id.
773. id. The document read in pertinent part:
The several certificates of deposit . .. are owned solely by me, and that I
have added my son Theodore's name to said accounts for convenience only and
not as gifts inter vivos. It is contemplated that the funds in these accounts
may be rolled over or reinvested at their maturities and that it shall be my
continuing purpose and intent to retain sole ownership therein.
Id.
774. Id. at 243-45. The party challenging the status of the accounts must meet
the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at
244.
775. 642 A.2d 525 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
776. Meyers, 642 A.2d at 526.
777. Id. When the executor discovered that there was a bank account with the
joint names of the decedent and the neighbor, he approached the neighbor and the
two entered into a settlement dividing the funds. Id. Subsequently, the executor
learned that a second account existed that contained a substantial amount of money.
Id. The second account was the subject of this action. Id.
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the decedent, it also determined that there was no undue influ-
ence exerted upon the decedent by the neighbor.778
On appeal before the superior court, the executor argued that
the existence of a confidential relationship shifted the burden of
proof to the transferee to prove that the gift was voluntary.7"'
Judge Weiand, writing for the court, explained that this was an
issue of first impression for Pennsylvania appellate courts."c
In refuting the executor's arguments, the superior court held
that the presumption created by the existence of the joint ac-
count was not rebutted, nor did it shift the burden of proof,
simply because the transferee was in a confidential relationship
with the decedent.7"" The court asserted that the existence of a
relationship was relevant evidence that could be considered, but
the estate had to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
the decedent's intent was not to make an inter vivos gift.'e
Therefore, the court concluded that the account belonged to the
neighbor despite the existence of a confidential relationship.7"
778. Id. at 526-27.
779. Id. at 527.
780. Id. at 528. This issue had been decided prior to the enactment of 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6304 (1994).
781. Meyers, 642 A.2d at 528.
782. Id.
783. Id. During the 1993 session an amendment to Title 20, section 2103 of the
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes was proposed that would deprive a parent of the
right to receive an intestate share if during the life of the child that parent failed
to pay court ordered support or abandoned the child during its life. See H.R. Res.
2636, 178th Reg. Seas., Gen. Assam. (1994). The amended statute would provide:
If no issue survives the decedent, then to the parent or parents of the dece-
dent, except that any parent who has failed to pay court-ordered child support
or who has abandoned the decedent during the life of the decedent shall be
prohibited from taking an intestate share from the estate of the deceased
child.
Id. The bill remained in the House Committee on the Judiciary at the close of the
178th session of the General Assembly.

